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[Abstract]  I here present the major comparative data on corruption in the Sub-Sa-
hara Africa region. The emphasis is on street level forms of corruption, but a few 
models directed towards explaining political forms of corruption relevant to the 
region are also presented. The paper discusses whether we may ﬁnd some plausible 
mechanisms that may operate across most African countries at the same time as 
they may not work to the same degree elsewhere.
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1. Introduction: the choice of the area and the relevance of the issue1 
This paper deals mainly with present corruption in Sub-Saharan Africa.2  It focuses on corrup-
tion in the public sector. It focuses as much as possible on empirical observations. Hence it 
will be mostly biased in the direction of street-level corruption. This does not imply that I 
believe political and high level forms of corruption are less important. On the contrary, but the 
opinions here are stronger and data more difficult to access and more difficult to interpret. It is 
clearly explorative in nature, a working paper. No definite conclusions are to be expected. 
 
To choose Sub-Saharan Africa as an area for exploration creates obviously some forms of 
bias. At the one hand the area is so wide, the number of countries so large and the set of insti-
tutions so extensive and many sided that any general mechanisms that ties corruption to other 
aspects of governance and levels of economic development or rates of growth are likely to be 
picked up by African data, but then be wrongly be ascribed to some African peculiarities. 
Why then restrict the observations to this sub-continent? It can only create a selection bias. 
On the other hand, given the wide variety of political arrangements and institutional condi-
tions in African countries, what kind of generalities may be sought that is not to be found at 
this general level?  
 
While I don’t have any strong opinion here I do believe it may be worth exploring to search 
for some. And even if we don’t succeed, we may have acquired a better grasp on scale of the 
problems and the country differences in the area. 
  
Compared to other large geographical areas the fraction of the population that is poor is 
higher, as is the average perceived corruption level according to the estimates of the World 
Bank Institute. The day to day experience of paying bribes appears more frequent. One of the 
reasons for being concerned with corruption is that somehow poverty and corruption appar-
ently are connected. It will be simplistic, however, to look for any simple causal relationship, 
since both phenomena are obviously connected to a wide set of factors, not all overlapping. 
 
                                                 
1 I will thank Øyvind Eggen and Per Botolf Maurseth at Norwegian Institute of Affairs for constructive criticism 
and helpful suggestions to an earlier draft, and the Norwegian Research Council’s projects “Trade growth and 
governance” and “State failure and regional insecurity” for financial support 
2 In the following I will most of the time apply the term Africa for Sub-Saharan Africa. The exact extension of 
the latter term is implicitly determined by the list of countries in Appendix 1. 
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Corruption in particular will be associated with a number of other mechanisms that influence 
the operation of the governments. An important starting point for the paper is the assumption 
that a task-focused, hard-working, committed public bureaucracy is a key factor in any eco-
nomic development. Without it there will be hardly any rule of law implemented, little protec-
tion of property rights, and only delivery of other low quality public goods. The considerable 
activity spillovers that take place among public officials make public organizations quite frag-
ile (Andvig and Moene, 1994). 
 
How corruption impacts these activity spillovers and is itself affected by them, is a key ques-
tion when assessing the causes and consequences of corruption. How citizens respond to low 
quality public goods, and their effects on the private sector economy, what kind of signals 
they send to the bureaucracies superiors, the politicians, and what signals the politicians again 
feed back to the public instruments of implementation, the bureaucracies, is another important 
mechanism in the overall melange that is public governance. 
 
As pointed out in Medard (2000) it has proved extraordinarily difficult in Africa to establish 
working public governments that approach that ideal, here for short called a Weber state. At 
the beginning and towards the end I will briefly outline some of the macro mechanisms that 
have been proposed. The emphasis here is on colonial inheritance, kin-related behaviour and 
ideology. In the middle I present some of the empirical observations that appear relevant and 
fairly reliable and some economic mechanisms that are at work in any low income countries.  
 
 
1.1 Overview of the evidence3 
Corruption is obviously a phenomenon that is difficult to observe but easy to have opinions 
about.. Hence, when we do get empirical information it allows us to get a more precise under-
standing, although the information may not be shaped in such a way that it allows any precise 
testing. Here I bring in information of very different kinds and have to some extent let the 
data dictate the discussion. The outcome is necessarily fragmented, maybe even confusing at 
times. 
 
                                                 
3 Transparency International (2007a) has published a fairly extensive overview of the measurement tools that 
have been applied to SSA countries 
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What kind of evidence do we have? I have drawn at least on the following forms of empirical 
evidence:  
1) The aggregate country indexes of corruption. Here we will present the 
World Bank Institute’s (WBI) index that is available for all Sub-Saharan 
countries. It is still to a large degree based upon expatriates’ perceptions, and 
conceptually confusing 
2) For some countries there have been developed questionnaires where the re-
searchers have asked the respondents about their various experiences with 
corruption. Here the Afrobarometers have had the clearest comparative fo-
cus within the African area, but we will bring in several other comparative 
research efforts.  
3) A number of single country efforts have been made to map the relative ex-
perienced frequency of corrupt encounters between different groups of pub-
lic officials and citizens and (sometimes) enterprises.  
4) A number of public commissions have explored corruption issues systemati-
cally and documented empirical cases. I present only a couple. 
5) A large number of single case studies have been documented by investiga-
tive journalists and social scientists. Here I had to be very selective and sub-
jective, and have chosen to discuss cases that appear either exceptionally 
well documented, or reflecting mechanisms that I think are exceptionally 
important. 
 
While I in this paper bring together and mutually confront a larger set of empirical sources on 
corruption in African countries than I am aware has been done elsewhere, time restraints have 
made it impossible to tap as much from the sources in 3) to 5) as would be desirable. Hence, 
considerable work remains to be done in order to gain an overview of the empirical situations 
in the countries in question. 
 
 
1.2 The issue of macro-historical explanations and colonial roots 
When explaining present distribution of governance properties in Africa, we find in the litera-
ture that three major set of factors have been proposed: colonialism, the pre-colonial sets of 
governance and geographical characteristics. Several mechanisms within each set have been 
proposed.  
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 • Mamdani (1996) has argued that the forms of indirect rule introduced by the vari-
ous colonial powers have survived in what he called bifurcated forms of govern-
ment in many African countries. Local government under indirect rule was allo-
cated to single chiefs who possessed almost all powers: judicial, police, tax collec-
tion and so on. Although designated chiefs they were only accountable to the colo-
nial administration, not to local citizens. They oversaw rule systems that in impor-
tant respects were different from the one that ruled in the cities and among the 
European population. The theory is obviously exceptionally important when ex-
plaining corruption issues in local tax administration. Alas, we have not been able 
to deal with that here, but the mechanism is highlighted by our discussion of cor-
ruption in local land allocation and the attempts of corrupt arbitrage of land be-
tween traditional and market-based ownership systems. 
• In the final analysis any colonial administration had to be centralised with the 
heads of administration being employed by and therefore accountable to principals 
residing abroad. This applied to some degree both to the directly ruled and the in-
directly ruled parts of the system. When the countries moved away from colonial 
rules to become independent, the “natural” change, the one that minimised the in-
stitutional shifts necessary, was to locate the right to appoint and to dismiss public 
employees in a single individual, a president. The president form of rule has ac-
cording to most experts on present-day African political systems been of excep-
tional importance on the continent.4  Here I will illustrate the role of the president’s 
power for present day corruption in the forms of land –grabbing, a form of embez-
zlement, in countries like Kenya and Zambia. To allow it to expand in the way it 
has done, we have to note another residue of colonialism: the nationalisation of 
most land belonging to the colony. In the new system it “belonged” to the presi-
dent. 
• The preceding possibly colonialism-related corruption mechanisms should in prin-
ciple apply to most countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, maybe with some variation 
according to which country that had been the colonial ruler. Still the variation 
among the countries with respect to corruption appears to be considerable. Two 
                                                 
4 At the outset, multi party democratic systems were initiated at the outset of the transition to independence, but 
in most cases proved not to yield a political equilibrium, at least not in the first decades of the transition. An 
overview of major quantitative aspects of the political systems on the continent is Bates (2008). 
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different lines of explanations have been suggested5: i) the colonial governance 
structures were actually quite different depending on the death rate and therefore 
also the size of the European settler population. High death rates implied that it 
was not in the ruler’s interest to develop efficient governmental institutions. When 
Acemoglu et al (2001) sought to study the exogenous impact of institutions on pre-
sent economic development, they suggested that low economic performance (and 
high corruption levels) were correlated with colonies with few European settlers. 
Presumably, such colonies would develop an extractive governance structure. Set-
tlers would participate in the political system at home and create some democratic 
impulses back to the home countries as well as in their colonies that may constrain 
the subsequent governance structures. ii) Englebert (2000) hypothesises that if the 
same colonial structure were imposed on different indigenous political systems, 
and then was dismantled, the outcome would vary according to the original, pre-
colonial political system. In some cases, like Botswana, the colonial interlude 
would not rob the present government of legitimacy.  
 
Englebert rightly points out that both the simple colonial explanation and its competitor that is 
stressing the exceptionally important roles the kin systems play both for the norms held and 
behaviour inside and outside family contexts in most countries in Sub-Saharan countries, may 
not explain variations across the African countries well. They may, for example, not explain 
the Botswana case. Nevertheless, I think the kin systems and family ideology have obviously 
been important in shaping the incidence and forms of corruption we may observe in Sub-
Saharan Africa. We will return to the matter in a number of contexts. 
 
In an important book Herbst (2000) has stressed geographical factors as important in shaping 
African governance issues.A typical African country would consist of large geographical ar-
eas have been divided somewhat arbitrarily and populated with fairly sparse populations. This 
has made it difficult to establish effective rule outside the densely populated areas. While this 
may have obvious implication for the possibility of creating competing violence organiza-
tions, the implications for the internal geographical distribution of bribes are not so obvious. 
While less control in outlying areas may make it easier to get away with rule-braking, there 
                                                 
5 They have been proposed to explain the variation in GDP levels or growth rates, but they should apply to the 
variation in corruption rates too. Mulinge and Lesetedi (1999) is one of few studies that link corruption directly 
to colonialism, but they make no attempt to explain the intra Africa variation. 
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would also be less valuable possibilities too. An obvious exception would be for the customs 
sites. Moreover, the suggested mechanism may be important in explaining the why embez-
zlement of funds targeted for outlying areas may be more extensive. We will see a few exam-
ples later on. Recently, in a large empirical project on the political economy of the African 
countries Ndulu et al (2008) have explored the consequences for various aspects of govern-
ance and growth of African countries of being landlocked and resource poor, resource rich or 
coastal and resource poor, but I haven’t been able to follow up this line of research to explore 
the specific consequences of for the distribution of corruption. Finally Azam (2008) have 
studied the role of corruption-like mechanisms for keeping peace in countries that are divided 
in poor and richer parts.  
 
 
2. Forms and characteristics of corrupt behaviour 
The standard definition of corruption is “abuse of public power for private benefit” or some 
variation thereof. Read literally this is a much too wide definition since most employees of 
any organization would daily abuse their position to some degree. Corruption refers to some 
fairly serious abuse of power. I will not try to develop any precise definition here, but simply 
list up the most typical corrupt actions and leave them fairly undefined.6  Most observers 
would consider embezzlement, stealing and fraud as corruption when the stealing and fraud 
are made possible by the criminal’s public position. Moreover, extortion (when the extortion 
is illegal or against the interest of the organization) and bribes are also different forms of cor-
rupt acts. Bribes are of course the most typical corrupt act. 
 
What all these actions have in common are i) that they are made possible by (at least one) 
actor’s public position and ii) they violate a given rule, law or public norm and iii) violation 
of the rule is to the material advantage of the violator(s) and iv) to the disadvantage of the 
stated aims of the organization where at least one of the actors is a member.  
 
Their transactional structure is different, however. Embezzlement embraces acts where every-
one directly involved belong to the public apparatus. The immediate causes may then be 
sought inside the state apparatus itself. Extortion implies an asymmetric power relationship, 
more often than not between a member and a non-member of a public organization. Stealing 
                                                 
6 I have tried to make a fairly precise definition in Andvig (2008). 
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(when not either extortion or embezzlement) has been important in land grabbing, and is a 
common form of police corruption. A typical example is where a policeman steals some of 
the goods that belong to a convict. Bribing is – unlike embezzlement – clearly a transaction 
between a member and a non-member of the public organization. It is also a voluntary form 
for transaction, at least at the first stage of analysis. Since it involves both actors inside and 
outside the public organization one may even at the first stage not explain it by looking at the 
public organization in isolation. Hence, it is quite possible that one should look at different 
sets of causes for these different forms of corruption. While we sometimes may explain em-
bezzlement by the internal workings of the state, that is clearly impossible when we seek to 
explain bribing. 
 
When regular, bribing is an illegal form for market transaction, the buying and selling of po-
litical or bureaucratic transaction, a transgression by the market into the spheres of bureau-
cratic and political modes of transaction that have been erected by the dominant forms of 
modern governance (Andvig, 2006)  
 
Since the immediate motivation of all the forms of corruption listed above is the seeking of 
material advantage, corruption may not be considered as any abnormality. On the contrary, 
when assuming that everyone are pursuing their economic self-interests, the difficulty lies 
rather in explaining why corruption is not more dominant in all formal organizations, includ-
ing the state. 
 
It is also important to note when we compare corruption incidences across countries, that our 
definitions of corruption is anchored in a rule system. It is certain violations of that rule sys-
tem that constitutes corruption. If the rule system changes, so does the set of conceivably cor-
rupt actions. This is of particular importance when we consider an area like Sub-Saharan Af-
rica where the changes of rule systems have been exceptionally large and where we may have 
reason to believe that the public employees and the citizens themselves, may be influenced by 
somewhat contradictory rules (Andvig, 2006). 
 
We should further note how heterogeneous corrupt acts are. They may conceivably take place 
at all hierarchic levels and in all the different sectors of government, where the public officials 
may be facing a wide variety of corrupt opportunities and punishment restraints. While we 
may have fairly clear ideas about what aggregate labour input implies in terms of actions, or 
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aggregate private consumption in terms of output or consequences, aggregate corruption re-
flects a more bewildering set of actions with consequences almost impossible to pinpoint in 
concrete terms. This is a major reason why we have difficulties in finding meaningful aggre-
gates of it. 
 
Note that I here do not include nepotism, or direct, irregular intrusion of family-friendship 
modes of transaction in the definition. That may be equally harmful to a Weber state or a pri-
vate enterprise, but it is a different phenomenon.  
 
 
3.  Corruption barometers and other quantitative governance aggregates 
For obvious reasons no system for directly observing, quantify and aggregate actual corrupt 
actions exists. Nevertheless, several efforts have been made to achieve a numerical basis for 
comparison of corruption levels across countries in more roundabout ways. As mentioned in 
the introduction, one approach has been to construct an aggregate index based on miscellane-
ous forms of information that may contain traces of corrupt behaviour that then are weighted 
together.  
 
Here I will present three such indexes. One is the World Bank Institute’s “Control of corrup-
tion” index. It consists of corruption assessments based on perceptions made by different 
groups of academic experts, international organizations, single country questionnaires di-
rected to households, expert or enterprises in single countries, and so on.7   
 
The main objection to this particular index is that for a number of reasons8 outside experts’ 
and businessmen’s perceptions are likely to count too heavily, that the reported margins of 
errors are high, but in actual fact they will be significantly higher, 9  so any ranking of coun-
tries are likely to be misleading. The yearly mean rate of corruption is fixed to zero, and rang-
ing roughly between 2,5 to -2,5, with -2,5 as the most corrupt.  
 
                                                 
7 I could alternatively have used Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index, but that covers fewer 
countries, have less transparent aggregation procedures and is in any case strongly correlated with the WBI in-
dex. It has the attractive feature that it does not assume a normal, but rather a uniform distribution of corruption 
levels across countries. 
8 The latest presentation of results of the WBI index is Kaufmann et al. (2008). A good critical overview of this 
(and other) governance indicators is Arndt and Oman (2006).  
9 Both objections are related to a highly likely correlation of perceptions between the different groups of busi-
nessmen and experts. 
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To gain a point of comparison I have included another governance index, the so called Ibra-
him index of African Governance. It is a new index, exceptionally broad in that embraces 
corruption, crime rates, human rights and so on, but it gives exceptionally large weight to 
public outputs and less to expatriate perceptions. Hence it may cover better the output side of 
public governance as it may appear to citizens. It is constructed with the single aim of com-
paring African countries. The WBI corruption index of 2006 should refer to the same time 
period as the latest of Ibrahim observations, the Ibrahim 2005 index.  
 
As an additional point of comparison I also included a measure of GDP/capita from about the 
same time period. In addition to given a rough indication of the economic level of the country, 
it may also indicate the efficiency of the formal organizations, including the public ones. Po-
litical scientists like Fearon has applied it in similar ways To get a feeling of eventual changes 
in corruption perceptions, we have included the oldest that include all the Sub-Saharan coun-
tries, the 1998 estimates.  
 
The reason why I want to include some indexes of formal organizational efficiency here, is to 
explore whether there may be close correlation between that and corruption levels. Note that 
both efficiency indexes will tend to overestimate the organizational efficiency of very re-
source rich countries like the Equatorial Guinea10 . 
 
It will lead us too far to go into the details of the corruption indicator here, but it may be use-
ful to keep in mind that it is heavily influenced by the perceptions of the outside business and 
aid communities, and may conceivably have strong effects on aid and foreign direct invest-
ment levels. 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
10 WBI has its own index of government efficiency that might be used, but I found it advantages to present an 
indicator that was cooked in a different kitchen. 
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Table1. Overview of corruption and other governance indices in Sub-Saharan countries  
   WBI corruption index11    
                                                
 Ibrahim index12 GDP/capita13
   1998 2006 2005  2005  
Angola   -1,37 -1,27 44,3  2335  
Benin   -0,75 -0,59 61,2  1141  
Botswana   0,75 0,86 73  12387  
Burkina Faso  -0,03 -0,4 56,7  1213  
Burundi   -1,3 -1,12 46,8  699  
Cameroon   -1,23 -1 55,6  2299  
Cape Verde  -0,32 0,6 72,9  5803  
Central African Republic -1,18 -1 46,7  1224  
Chad   -1 -1,2 38,8  1427  
Comoros   -1,23 -0,65 53,8  1993  
Congo   -1,23 -1,08 52,1  1262  
Congo, Democratic Republic -1,73 -1,44 38,6  714  
Cote d'Ivoire  -0,38 -1,22 48,8  1648  
Djibouti   -0,69 -0,62 52,5  2178  
Equatorial Guinea  -1,39 -1,52 51,6  7874  
Eritrea   0,77 -0,32 48,3  1109  
Ethiopia   -0,56 -0,65 53,2  1055  
Gabon   -0,73 -0,9 67,4  6954  
Gambia   -0,54 -0,71 55,8  1921  
Ghana   -0,35 -0,1 66,8  2480  
Guinea   -0,83 -1 51,5  2316  
Guinea-Bissau  -1,12 -0,99 42,7  827  
Kenya   -1,11 -0,89 59,3  1240  
Lesotho   -0,21 -0,05 64,1  3335  
Liberia   -1,72 -0,66 42,7   ….  
Madagaskar  -0,4 -0,24 57,7  923  
Malawi   -0,39 -0,72 63,7  667  
Mali   -0,61 -0,42 56,9  1033  
Mauritania  -0,14 -0,6 58,8  2234  
Mauritius    0,44 0,36 86,2  12715  
Mozambique  -0,72 -0,65 55,8  1242  
Namibia   0,67 0,14 67  7586  
Niger   -1,04 -0,95 53,1  781  
Nigeria   -1,12 -1,14 48,3  1128  
Rwanda   -0,87 -0,11 57,5  1206  
Sao Tome and Principe -0,38 -0,53 65,3  2178  
Senegal   -0,31 -0,45 66  1792  
Seychelles  0,47 0,07 83,1  16106  
Sierra Leone  -0,94 -1,1 48,3  806  
Somalia   -1,72 -1,82 28,1   ….  
South Africa  0,64 0,44 71,1  11110  
Sudan   -1 -1,15 40  2083  
Swaziland   -0,02 -0,41 50,9  4824  
Tanzania   -1,09 -0,42 60,7  744  
Togo   -0,61 -1,09 49,8  1506  
Uganda   -0,88 -0,73 55,4  1454  
Zambia   -0,88 -0,71 57,5  1023  
Zimbabwe   -0,38 -1,32 52  2038  
 
11 Kaufmann et al.(2008, 94–96).  
12 http://www.moibrahimfoundation.org/index 
13 UNDP (2007, 229–232). GDP is measured in $ PPP. 
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When we condense this information into scatter diagrams, we see that while perceived corrup-
tion decreases with GDP/capita,the most striking property is that GDP levels are clustered at a 
low range. Within that range perceived corruption levels may vary strongly: 
 
Figure1: GDP and perceived corruption
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If we may interpret the Ibrahim index mainly as an indicator of public output, we see a close 
correlation between the states’ supply capacity and the perceived corruption level across the 
range of African countries: 
 
Figure 2: Public output - perceived 
corruption
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Several of these results are rather striking – particularly the strong correlation between the 
Ibrahim and WBI indexes – if we really could believe they were indexes about the phenomena 
they claim to be. Alas, I strongly doubt so. Hence, we should be careful not to claim to much 
for it.  
 
It is nevertheless worth noting by inspecting Table 1 that in both 1998 and in 2006 the per-
ceived country average for Africa was far below world average (-0, 64 in 1998, -0,66 in 2006 
as against 0 as the World average is constructed to be). 
 
 
4.  Comparative, quantitative information about street level corruption compared 
This impression is confirmed if we look at another set of data where more or less representa-
tive samples of households in a number of countries have been asked about their experiences 
with corruption the last year (last half year, or last two years). When grouped into continents, 
African households clearly experience the highest bribe frequency according to one set of 
surveys14: 
 
Table 2. Percentage of households paying a bribe last year  
  2006 2007
    
Africa  38 % 42 %
Asia Pacific 7 % 22 %
Latin America 17 % 13 %
 NIS  12 % 21 %
South East Europe 9 % 12 %
EU  2 % 5 %
North America 2 % 2 %
 
Source: TI (2007: 21), TI (2006: 18)  
 
The results of Table 2 are striking: The regular citizens in Africa have to pay bribes more fre-
quently than citizens on other continents although we may expect them to have fewer interac-
tions with the government. A number of qualifications are here in order, again:  
 
                                                 
14Two international attempts to standardise questions have been made. One has been made as a part of a long 
lasting effort to make comparable crime data based on household experiences, the international crime victimisa-
tion surveys (ICVS) and organised by UNICRI. The second is organised by Transparency International and pub-
lished in at present a yearly publication, “The Transparency International Global Corruption Barometer” and 
presented here in Table 2.  
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1)  The continent average is in fact based on surveys from only a few countries from each 
continent. The fact that the table is based on reported experience, that the questionnaires 
have been standardised and the numbers reported have a fairly clear meaning, is clearly 
a great advantage. But 
2)  the percentage reported from the same country varies excessively even when the ques-
tions apparently are the same, suggesting that there must be strong framing effects pre-
sent that are difficult to account for.  
3)  Only some forms of corruption are included. For example, neither embezzlement, nor 
political corruption nor the regular enterprise bribing are included. The credence of the 
result is increased, however, by the fact that the different ICVS approach reaches similar 
results.15 
 
No significant improvement in the perception of the Sub-Saharan countries compared to the 
world average took place according to Table 1 (from -0.64 to -0.66). When looking at the 
movement in perceived corruption for the single countries in Table 1 the impression of a 
fairly unchanged situation the last decade or is confirmed: 24 countries recorded lower and 24 
countries higher levels of perceived corruption, but only in a few cases appear perceptions to 
have shifted significantly: 
 
Cape Verde and Liberia appear to have improved while Cote d’Ivoire, Eritrea and Zimbabwe 
appear to have worsened significantly. Note again, however, that this may be mainly due to 
shifts in foreigners’ perceptions, not experienced facts. Here it may be of interest to compare 
the WBI index with the Ibrahim index and note the cases where the country rankings differ 
with more than ten points. Compared this way, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Kenya, Malawi 
and Zimbabwe rank much better on the Ibrahim index and Eritrea, Guinea – Bissau, Liberia 
and Zwaziland much worse. Finally, when comparing GDP levels and the corruption indica-
tor, Equatorial Guinea and Gabon are perceived as highly corrupt although their GDP levels 
are quite high. Oil probably explains both. 
 
How to relate the information contained in Table 1 and in Table 2? Razafindrakoto and Rou-
baud (2006) made an interesting experiment. They had acquired exceptionally solid estimates 
                                                 
15 Van Dijk (2008: 183) reports that while 38.9% of the public in West and Central Africa and 37.1% in East 
Africa had been involved in bribe-giving the last year, the highest incident among the other sub-regions was 
South Asia with 23.1%. His number are partly based on the ICVS surveys (and TI, 2004).  
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on bribing percentages from a number of West African countries and Madagascar with larger 
samples using the national central bureaux of statistics. Then they collected a number of cor-
ruption and country experts and asked them what percentages of the population they believed 
had been in bribe-giving positions last year. We may now look at the results from Table 3. I 
have included the percentage estimates of the population bribe givers from the 3. round of the 
Afrobarometer surveys as reported in Razafindrakoto and Robaud (2007: 24) and completed it 
with a few observations from TI’s Global Corruption Barometers from the same list of Sub-
Saharan countries. We may then also get an impression of the variability of the results from 
the different surveys (and for the same survey, when replicated).  
 
Table3. Some estimates of bribe-giving percentages in a list of African countries16 
   1-2-3 Surveys  Afrobarometer 2006 Transparency International 
        
  population  experts Population 2007 2006 2004
        
Benin  8,70 % 53,70 % 32,50 %    
Botswana    3,70 %    
Burkina Faso 15,20 % 38,00 %     
Cape Verde   7,00 %   21,00 %
Cote d'Ivoire 16,50 % 58,20 %     
Ghana    31,70 %    
Kenya    48,10 %  21,00 % 19,00 %
Lesotho    11,30 %    
Madagascar 16,30 % 54,00 % 26,30 %    
Malawi    9,80 %    
Mali  10,10 % 49,10 % 23,90 %    
Mozambique   38,70 %    
Namibia    26,80 %    
Niger  8,20 % 53,40 %     
Nigeria    41,50 % 40,00 % 38,00 % 29,00 %
Senegal  10,80 % 50,80 % 25,10 % 38,00 % 29,00 % 19,00 %
South Africa   16,90 % 3,00 % 5,00 % 5,00 %
Tanzania    21,90 %    
Togo  9,60 % 59,20 %    30,00 %
Uganda    40,60 %    
Zambia     28,80 %    
Zimbabwe    33,00 %    
 
Sources: Razafindrakoto and Roubaud (2006), : Razafindrakoto and Roubaud (2007), TI (2004, 2006, 2007) 
 
Razafindrakoto and Roubaud discovered that 1) while their experts’ assessment of the popula-
tions’ exposure to bribes was strongly correlated with the WBI corruption perception index, it 
                                                 
16 This table contains too many empty observation points to be used for statistical purposes, but it should have 
some heuristic value to have such diverse information in a single table. 
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was uncorrelated with the actual incidence, and 2) the experts strongly overestimated the inci-
dence.17   
 
Looking at the variability of petty corruption across countries we may note, for example, that 
the highest estimate of bribe exposure for South Africa is more than five times of the lowest 
one. The Afrobarometer of 2006 gives a very different picture of Kenya than TI’s global ba-
rometer surveys. They indicate that Kenya may be in the middle or lower range among Sub-
Saharan countries while the Afrobarometer suggests it is at the very top, sixteen percent above 
Nigeria. This high variability makes it difficult to believe that any given survey is close to the 
true incidence of corruption among citizens, but they do indicate that bribe-paying is a regular 
feature of the citizen- public official interaction in most African countries.  
 
With regard to street level corruption, the form of corruption reported on in Table 3, there is a 
significant difference between rich and developing countries such as the African ones.18  In 
rich countries citizens are not normally paying bribes for regular public services, but enter-
prises may. Petty corruption in low income countries clearly reflects a tax collecting compo-
nent. Considered as a tax it appears often to be regressive, the poor appears to pay more in 
relative terms and maybe also absolutely. According to Razafindrakoto and Roubaud (2007: 
11), while about 30% of the very poorest in the 18 countries that participated in the 3. round 
of the Afrobarometer surveys had been victims of corruption, only 20% of the most well-offs 
had been so.19   
 
                                                 
17 The reported experience data from the 1–2–3 survey indicate lower numbers than the other surveys. While this 
may due to their better methodological quality, it may also be partly explained by the fact that they were imple-
mented by the official central bureau of statistics, that may have made the respondents more careful when an-
swering causing an underestimating of the incidence. Or the employees in the survey may be less eager to please 
the sponsors with alarming results since they would deal with a number of other issues than corruption. If so, the 
1–2–3 survey should give superior results. Sosial anthropological research from a part of the same area indicate 
higher frequency (Blundo and Oliver de Sardhan, 2006), but their judgment is partly based on different data, 
how frequently corruption was on people’s mind when discussing corruption publicly.  
18 Exploring the matter Weber Abramo (2008) found the brake in the pattern here to be around 10 000US$ a 
year. With the exception of South Africa, Botswana, Mauritius and the Seychelles, the Sub-Saharan countries are 
below that limit according to Table 1. 
19 This is difficult to settle in a satisfactory way because of imprecise income data in the Afrobarometer survey 
as pointed out in Hunt (2008). She shows that whether bribe taxation may be progressive or regressive may de-
pend on the public institution involved,. While the bribe demands from the police appear to hit regressively, the 
judiciary hits progressively, rich pay relatively more, or so is the case in Peru. In the Afrobarometer survey in-
come is ranked according to whether you are able to feed yourself properly since proper income data are not 
willingly shared among many African groups, not even with the spouse. Hence I would expect the number of 
corrupt encounters with the authorities will be very sensitive to the number of children in care that will impact 
the meetings with health and school facilities. Are there more children located in poor or well off households?  
 19
What about the bribe paying among the enterprises? Here we don’t have comparable data 
across countries as we have for households. Initiated by the World Bank Institute, but spon-
sored and implemented by different institutions, “diagnostic” reports have been made for a 
few countries where questionnaires addressing corruption issues have been submitted both to 
enterprises, households and public officials. Alas – from a research point of view - there has 
been given so much country scope for choice in the detailed formulation of the questionnaires 
to make it difficult to compare the results across countries. In no African case I am aware of, 
do we find an assessment among the diagnostic reports about the percentage of enterprises 
that have paid bribes.20  Based on an enterprise survey performed by the employers’ associa-
tion in Uganda, however, Svensson (2003: 216) reports that 81% the enterprises that had an-
swered the question told that they had paid a bribe.  
 
It is likely that both the frequency of bribing and the size of the bribes are higher for enter-
prises than for consumers also in African countries, although the difference is less marked 
than in OECD countries where regular consumers rarely pay bribes at all. For example about 
65% of households in Nigeria reported that they had observed acts of corruption during the 
last two years (Nigeria Governance and Corruption Survey Study, 2003a: 12). The enterprises 
were not asked about any overall rate, however, but were presented with a list of different 
public services, among which at least four would demand regular contact (taxation, customs, 
connection to phones, electricity and getting licences and permits). For each service activity 
they assessed that an about 80% would demand bribes, ranging in frequency between “some-
times” to “always” (Nigeria Governance and Corruption Survey Study, 2003b: 9). While 
some overlapping must have taken place (one enterprise paying for several services) it sug-
gests more frequent bribe giving among the enterprises21   
 
In Ghana a diagnostic report suggest the size of bribe payments for household and enterprises. 
The difference is considerable. For example only about 4% of the households paid more than 
30 US$ a year22 , while the average bribe for the enterprises was 914 US$ for retail and 
                                                 
20 One reason may be that this is a more sensitive question to as an enterprise since it has more reason to doubt 
that its answer in fact will remain anonymous. Nevertheless, they appear to have been willing to answer surpris-
ingly sensitive questions in these diagniostic reports. 
21 Note that in another questionnaire a higher incidence of bribing among Nigerian households was recorded. 
Independent Advocacy Project (2007: 19) reports that in 2005 77% of the households have paid bribes. That had 
declined to 65% in 2007 (ibid.).  
22 Centre for Democracy and Development (2000: 54). 1US = 7 000 Cedi (average for 2000) according to 
www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/s194-01_e.doc. 
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wholesale trade and otherwise ranged between 1950US$ in construction and 449US$ in 
“Other Services” (ibid.: 85). 
 
The diagnostic reports also contain a number of interesting perception and value data. Here 
we may note that the households interaction with the traffic police in Ghana (MTTU) had the 
highest corruption incidence (87.1%) followed by the customs and the rest of institutions that 
had some kind of police functions. The post office had the lowest. But given the higher num-
ber of interactions with government hospitals, the households had almost eight times more 
corrupt transactions with the hospitals than with the traffic police and about twice as many as 
with all the police functions together. The regular police were considered the most dishonest 
public organization, however, a view held by both households and enterprises, and a view 
shared by Nigerians (households, enterprises and public officials) It was considered much 
more dishonest than the traffic police (Nigeria Governance and Corruption Survey Study, 
2003c: 57 -58).When looking for comparative data about group incidence, we are restrained 
to perception data. They have been collected from a number of African countries through the 
Afrobarometers (round 3).. 
 
 Table 4 Percentage of households who consider most/ all in the institution corrupt
          
  president member of local  national local police tax judges 
  p. officials parliament politicians officials  officials  officials  
Benin  43 % 43 % 39 % 50 % 41 % 58 % 72 % 58 %
Botswana  15 % 20 % 17 % 29 % 27 % 30 % 20 % 14 %
Cape Verde 9 % 8 % 9 % 7 % 8 % 7 % 7 % 5 %
Ghana  16 % 16 % 19 % 26 % 26 % 52 % 34 % 36 %
Kenya  26 % 40 % 38 % 33 % 37 % 64 % 35 % 28 %
Lesotho  6 % 11 % 8 % 19 % 5 % 35 % 14 % 11 %
Madagascar 11 % 15 % 12 % 11 % 13 % 31 % 20 % 25 %
Malawi  19 % 22 % 15 % 25 % 23 % 28 % 23 % 20 %
Mali  25 % 31 % 35 % 35 % 36 % 50 % 58 % 56 %
Mozambique 10 % 11 % 11 % 19 % 18 % 31 % 20 % 16 %
Namibia  22 % 27 % 29 % 35 % 34 % 44 % 37 % 32 %
Nigeria  54 % 59 % 57 % 59 % 58 % 75 % 56 % 40 %
Senegal  19 % 20 % 22 % 22 % 19 % 27 % 30 % 22 %
South Africa 22 % 26 % 44 % 36 % 45 % 48 % 22 % 22 %
Tanzania  5 % 8 % 10 % 9 % 11 % 34 % 20 % 25 %
Uganda   25 % 25 % 34 % 36 % 38 % 67 % 60 % 35 %
Zambia   31 % 38 % 35 % 36 % 40 % 70 % 50 % 31 %
Zimbawe  42 % 40 % 49 % 49 % 49 % 62 % 44 % 25 %
          
Average  22 % 25 % 27 % 30 % 29 % 45 % 35 % 28 %
 
Source: Logan et al (2006: 35) 
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For each country the group perceived as most corrupt has been emphasized. Note that the po-
lice are perceived as the most corrupt public institution in eleven out of the fifteen countries. 
In the three West African French speaking countries, however, it is the tax collecting institu-
tions that are considered the most corrupt. Here we also see that it is not only the perceptions 
of experts, but also the perceptions of the population that may move astray from actual inci-
dence. Benin and South Africa in particular appear to be perceived much more corrupt than 
they are likely to be (cf. South Africa and Lesotho). This is not so surprising since such per-
ceptions are likely to be influenced by a number of issues not directly reflecting corruption, 
such as the state of political debate in the country and what the citizens in general expect from 
public officials. Comparing the different public institutions, eventual police brutality is likely 
to feed into corruption perceptions too.  
 
While we only have experience data from Ghana, we have no reason to believe that countries 
in Sub-Saharan Africa is an exception from the general feature of developing countries: the 
police are the public institution where the public experience most densely corrupt forms of 
transactions.23   
 
 
5.  Patterns of petty corruption. Social anthropology observations 
So far we have looked at some of the quantitative data on corruption in African countries. 
They are all based on questionnaires of one kind or another. Here I will report from another 
form of research, mainly performed by social anthropologists.24  Here the researchers engage 
directly with the research subjects in more “natural” situations. While strong selection bias is 
unavoidable, direct observations are possible. Moreover, it may be possible to detect patterns 
in both behaviours and beliefs that are not detectable when chopping up data in the isolated 
pieces formal questionnaires by necessity give rise to.  
 
                                                 
23 TI (2007a: 5), Andvig and Fjeldstad (2008: 12). 
24 Alas, there has been surprisingly little research interest in corruption among social anthropologists until re-
cently. There are several reasons for this. One is that to brand anything as corruption, smells of open ethnocen-
trism – a major break of research ethics in this field. Moreover to walk around asking subjects directly about 
corruption leads easily the researcher into artificial or awkward situations and “sneaky” or dishonest behaviour. 
Nevertheless, it has proved possible to produce serious research with the approach based on frank research sub-
jects. 
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The largest research project of this kind for Africa is reported in Blundo and Olivier de Sar-
dan (2006).25  They confirm that bribes - regular non-authorised payments to public officials - 
are a persistent part of the daily interaction between officials and citizens both in Benin, Niger 
and Senegal.  
 
In one case study (ibid.: 177 - 182) one of the researchers followed a truck loaded with sheep 
from one end of Benin (Malanville) to another (Cotonou). The truck had to pass about sixteen 
control posts, each extorting an illegal fee. The size of the fee hinged upon what kind of po-
lice or (internal) customs officer who were involved, and on which assignment. In most cases 
the police officers demanded about 3US$ (2000CFA) and the customs officers half of that. 
The largest charges were made by the gendarmes – about 8US$. The prices were rather fixed, 
but negotiations were nevertheless taking place. In one case the police was on an assignment 
where they were not supposed to collect, but fraudulently attempt to charge about 5.5US$, but 
the driver successfully refused to pay. 
 
According to standard rules of fair play officers from one station should have a fixed amount 
so if stopped twice within that station’s control area, the second stop should be free or the 
truck should only pay half price to each. Some police stations were playing fair and sticking 
to the rules, others were not and demanded full price at all stops.  
 
According to anecdotal evidence26  regular extortion of person transport in Benin is not so 
common while proliferating in Senegal, where the police almost socialise older children to 
follow their procedures. 
 
The richest fishing fields for the customs and transport monitoring police are connected to 
cross-border transport. At the ports and other stations that handle such transport, elaborate 
systems of paper handling had developed in all three countries. Together with the large eco-
nomic values involved, the time pressures on the traders, and the ease by which custom offi-
cials may cause delays were all factors that made corruption in the custom organizations the 
economically most significant of the street level corruption accessible to observation by the 
social anthropologists in the three West African countries.  
                                                 
25 The theme consisted of six researchers and fourteen research assistants doing field and documentary work for 
two years in the West African countries Benin, Niger and Senegal.  
26 Observations made by Griet Seurs and presented at a U4 course on anti-corruption. 
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 While not directly observed by the research group itself, Blundo and Olivier de Sardan 
(20o6:215) refer to estimates that indicate that the corrupt income generated at the customs 
stations constituted about twenty percent of the state budget. This was partly reflected in the 
yearly income of a custom official they were observing who dealt directly with cross-border 
trade. He earned about hundred thousand US$.27   
 
Moreover, around each custom station the research group could observe rich underbrush of 
brokers. On average, for each custom official there appeared to be about four of them. Some 
were licensed, some were not. One group acted as a kind of spies for the leadership of the 
station to assess how much the lower ranks collected in order to check whether the leadership 
received its reasonable cut. It was also essential for the leadership to check on bribery rates 
and the de facto customs collection for wider reasons. If the customs officials were too strict 
with the latter, too few traders would show up. – As a part of new public management each 
customs station was assigned a fixed quota of customs to be collected - partly in order to re-
duce corruption. Given the competition for traders between the stations, however, the authors 
indicate that the reform had the opposite effect: to get more traders the effective tariffs had to 
go down. This went together with bribes. 
 
Other brokers were mainly hired by lower-grade customs officials or by the traders them-
selves. In addition to organise the complex paper handling and bribe sequences for the traders, 
some brokers were able to organise smuggling alternatives, that is, to export or import the 
goods without any paper trail at all. The brokers’ smuggling networks would often involve 
both custom officials and police at both sides of the border. Smuggling and corruption of cus-
toms officials may sometimes be complementary, sometimes alternative sets of action.  
The size of the combined effects of smuggling and cross border trade between Nigeria and 
Benin, is indicated by the official statistics of the two countries Central Bureau of Statistics in 
Nigeria recorded 109.3 billion CFA francs worth of export from Nigeria to Benin. Benin only 
recorded about 5 billion CFA as imports from Nigeria.(ibid.: 214). 
 
                                                 
27 Informants told the researchers that the custom officials earned about 200–300 000 CFA a day on such posts. 
With 250 working days a year this should be around hundred thousand US dollars a year (ibid. 209). No wonder 
that such posts were bought and sold, but the authors don’t report any capital values of the posts.  
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In addition to the brokers that did genuine, but to a large extent, corrupt services for the trad-
ers, a rich supply of fraudster congregated around the customs offices. For example some pre-
tended to be brokers. As such they pretended they were paying custom officials to get the 
goods across the port, but run away with the money themselves. The necessary secrecy sur-
rounding corrupt transaction made also large scope for frauds. 
 
This possibility arose, of course, not only around custom offices. Around almost any office 
for public services crowds of unpaid (by the state) voluntary workers congregated. They 
sometimes did some of the works that the officials were supposed to do, sometimes they only 
defrauded the public. In Blundo and Olivier de Sardan (2006: 137 – 140) is presented a lively 
description of a court in Niger. It also supplied different forms of official identity papers, in-
cluding nationality certificates. They retell a story where the informant got shanghaied by a 
non-employed broker who pretended he could connect him with the official who supplied 
nationality certificates. In fact that official could not, but she had organised a racket with the 
unemployed broker as a sideline of her regular job.  
 
In addition to the existence of informal brokers basically simple procedures are frequently 
made difficult by the fact that the actual distribution of decision-making powers does not fol-
low its formal distribution. Blundo and Olivier de Sardan observe that the informal internal 
organisations of the state frequently were combined with their formal structures, and inter-
penetrated with kin and political networks in so complex and opaque ways that outsiders often 
would not know how services were become elicited. Complicated informal structures make 
brokers useful at the time as the very irregularity of the mass of brokers was part of the com-
plicated structure. Even the proper point of access is hidden for the regular citizen. In such 
situations there is no wonder that the specialist bribers may easily turn into fraudsters. 
 
The authors suggest an additional explanation for the existence of brokers. A shared colonial 
history had left its imprint on the workings of the state in all the three countries in its harsh 
and despotic ways of treating the regular citizens when it is in its formal, Weberian modes. 
Brokers may soften and personalise the access. On the whole, when organising bribe pay-
ments for the simple services, their activities are basically fraudulent and based on organising 
delays in procedures in cooperation with regular public officials. In more complicated, large 
scale operation, the middlemen may , as we have seen, do some real services through their 
commissioned bribing, as Blundo and Olivier de Sardan (ibid.:190) describes for the custom 
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services in the port of Cotonou where the release of a used car has to pass seventeen points of 
bribe collections. To know how to do it without causing prohibitive delays, will of course 
demand specialized knowledge. 
 
 
6. Petty embezzlement observed 
So far we have focused on forms of corruption petty corruption where the public has been 
directly involved, presumably bribing and extortion. Here I will look at empirical research 
into systems of regular, but small-scale embezzlement in the public sector. Again we find 
both relevant quantitative and qualitative information. It is in the nature of the case that here 
we have to look at the inside of the governmental apparatus. Quantitative information about 
its extent cannot be gathered by asking the public. 
 
Recently a number of attempts have been made to follow public expenditure flows as they 
descend from their central ministries to their intended points of destination, so called public 
expenditure tracking surveys (PETS). It has mainly been done in order to study service levels 
at schools and local health institutions. The idea is that one look at a specific budget item, for 
example, non wage primary school expenditures. The size of the grant for the purpose is ob-
served at the central ministry. Then a sample of schools from various districts is made, and 
the intended grants for each school are estimated. This is compared to what the schools actu-
ally have received. This difference divided by the size of the grant determines the degree of 
leakage. While there may be several reasons for the leakage it sets a kind of upper bound for 
the extent of embezzlement in the system.28 
 
Note that this method presupposes that it is possible to have fairly precise accounts at both the 
central and local ends of the public expenditure flows. This may often not be the case, and 
particularly so in cases where large leakages may be expected. Nevertheless interesting leak-
age rates have been estimated for several public expenditure flows in some African countries. 
The classical case is the central government of Uganda’s capitation grants for schools’ non 
wage expenditures 1991-1995, analysed in Reinikka and Svensson (2004). They found an 
average leakage rate of about 87% with large variation across schools. Large schools in richer 
neighbourhoods had on average lower leakage rates. They argue that the leakage at the school 
                                                 
28 In addition the schools may, of course, steal money the parents may pay for their children’s schooling. 
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and central levels were small, so most of the leakage appears to have taken place at the local 
and district levels. It is impossible on the basis of the data collected to determine how much 
has been embezzled for private enrichment, for patronage politics (often also leading to per-
sonal enrichment) or to other political priorities considered more important by local elites.  
 
In Tanzania a similar study embracing several forms of disbursements showed a leakage rate 
of 57% for education and 41% for health expenditures (Gauthier, 2006: 27)29 . For Ghana a 
leakage rate at about 50% for education and 80% for non wage expenditures (ibid.) has been 
estimated. In Zambia it was discovered, interestingly, that while the leakage rate for rule 
based educational grants was only 10%, it was 76% for discretionary non wage expenses. In 
Madagascar, surprisingly, higher estimated leakage rates were found for schools than health 
stations. The most striking result, however, was the dramatically higher rates found in the 
remote areas. For Kenya leakage rates were higher in the health than the educational sector, 
but more evenly distributed geographically. 80 % of the schools received too small grants, but 
only something small was nibbled away at each since the leakage rate for schools were only 
around 36%. The highest non wage leakage rate so far observed has been the health sector in 
Chad. There only 1% of expenditures reached the final destination. Already 73 % had been 
siphoned out at the regional level, so only 26% was left for the local officials to tap. 
 
A recurrent result was that the leakage rates for wage expenditures were much lower. Public 
officials naturally are monitoring their own wages more closely. Delays were frequent how-
ever. In Rwanda 82 % of the teachers reported that they had wage claims on the government 
due to delays in payment (ibid.: 46). While delays could be due to central government lacking 
funds, delays could also be manipulated. In a country with high interest and inflation rates and 
with business-minded public officials, even temporary illegitimate access to funds is highly 
profitable. 
 
Frontline public workers main form of embezzlement are their embezzling of their own time 
from the government. The absentee rates for teachers in Uganda were 27% and 37% for 
health workers (ibid.: 41).30  Any prevalence of “ghost” workers – public officials that don’t 
                                                 
29 The result here is somewhat surprising since it is reasonable to expect higher leakage rates for non wage health 
expenditures. They are more heterogeneous and constitute higher shares of total costs. A lower leakage rates in 
Tanzania compared to Ghana is as expected when looking at the other indicators of corruption levels. 
30 Here it should be noted that the absentee rates in Uganda was not significantly higher than in the more well-off 
India (Chaudury et al.: 92). 
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exist, but receive salaries, - is mainly due to embezzlement of public funds at higher levels. 
Here we have fewer estimates, however, but in the case of education in Uganda a survey as-
sessed it to 20% of the staff (ibid.).31 
 
In a study of health administration in two states in Nigeria, Lagos and Kogo (Das Gupta et al., 
2003), the authors found evidence of significant leakage or delays in wage payment for the 
rural state (Kogo). 42% of the local health station staff had not received salaries the last six 
months before the survey ibid (ibid.: 65). This was not due to lack of funds. There was no 
correlation between resources budget towards staff salaries and their non-payment. The non-
payment was apparently mainly due to leakage at the local levels. Private providing of health 
services increased where the leakage rates were higher. In the cases where the patients were 
not supposed to pay, this implied that they had to bribe in order to get their needed medical 
services. 
 
The case show how embezzlement internal to the public sector at one level may induce higher 
corruption levels also externally. It also indicates that some of the street-level bribe collection 
should be considered as a decentralised form of tax collection. It increases when wage funds 
have been embezzled. Herrera et al (2006: 42) document how petty corruption is related to 
wage payments for public officials in Madagascar. When real wage payment for civil servants 
increased by 50% in the period 1995 to 2001, the fraction of the population who reported that 
they had experienced bribe paying, was reduced from 42% to 10%. During a political crisis in 
2001 - 2002 ,when wage payment was uncertain and sometimes missing, the bribe rate in-
creased to 44% again before falling down to less than 10% in 2004 as wage payments became 
certain and increased in value again.  
 
While the data from Kenyamay be a partial exception, the embezzlement observations indi-
cate that Herbst’s geographical theory of the distribution of state power in larger African 
countries is worthy closer examination. 
  
 
 
                                                 
31 Most ghost workers are at the lower rings of the public hierarchy, since these jobs are easier to create. Some 
estimates about the number of ghost workers should be regarded in a critical light, since downsizing of public 
organizations have become a favoured policy in several multinational organizations. The perceived existence of 
a large number of ghost workers makes this an easier policy to implement. 
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7.  A social anthropological observation on petty embezzlement in Malawi 
A completely different look into the internal mechanics of embezzlement operation in African 
public apparatuses has been provided by social anthropologists. As the outcome of a 14 
months fieldwork living among civil servants in Malawi, Anders (2005) presents a fascinating 
portrait of their daily life. While hearing a lot of more or less convincing rumours about em-
bezzlements, as a European he only got access to a few cases to observe by himself. One case 
was quite extensive, involving several different corrupt operations, but only lower instances 
were involved, since the operation was organised from the outside, by a private sector trader 
with political pull.  
 
The civil servant involved, a “Mr. Banda”, held a low health administration post (ibid.: 193 – 
196) A truckload of maize provided by the World Food Programme, to be used a to improve 
the health situation of the very poor in his area of monitoring, came in his way. He embezzled 
it. That is, he stole this piece of public property. To be able to accomplish it, his administra-
tive superior would have to get a cut, and the police had to be silenced and paid. So around 
this embezzlement act, several less valuable bribery transactions had also to be made. Mr. 
Banda himself was not sufficiently powerful and connected to organise all these transactions. 
This was done by the trader who bought the truckload. Banda himself used the income earned 
from the sale to build up his private business. The motivation for the embezzlement was then 
clearly mainly economic, although some fear of the private trader might have been involved.  
 
The second case of embezzlement that is reported by Anders (ibid.: 197 – 201) was of differ-
ent kind and of more modest proportions. “Mr. Phiri” was a fairly high ranking official and he 
was comparatively well-off. The mother of his long-time and close servant had died and was 
going to be buried in her home village. The servant could not provide the proper transport and 
neither could Mr. Phiri, since his car was broken and he could not afford to repair it in time. 
Mr. Phiri then requisitioned two government cars for the purpose, filled in all the proper pa-
pers for it. Everything would have been legal if the servant had been close family. While 
close, he wasn’t family. Phiri’s superiors knew all about the circumstances, signed the papers 
and approved the act. Nevertheless, Mr. Phiri had embezzled two government cars with driv-
ers for two days. His motivation was a mixture of kindness and a desire of keeping his social 
status. 
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Mr. Phiri’s act is, despite its insignificance as an act of corruption, an important pointer to-
ward a mechanism that contributes to making petty corruption more frequent in African coun-
tries than in comparable countries elsewhere. 
 
________________________ 
 
 
When contemplating the various bits and pieces of information about petty corruption, bribes 
and embezzlement we have gathered here, an obvious question to raise is whether they are 
compatible or not? Given their nature, a strict statistical test is of course out of question, but 
still it should be answered. Konold (2007) wonders, for example, how to combine the impres-
sion gained from Blundo and Olivier de Sardhan’s research group that corruption is involved 
in most, if not all citizen-public servant transactions with the modest bribe perceptions and 
experience percentages for Senegal found in the Afrobarometers, round three.  
 
She suggests that respondents in the surveys may seriously underreport their experiences 
(ibid.: 13). Paying bribes is, after all, an illegal activity. Since the 1-2-3 surveys were exe-
cuted by government institutes this effect may have been stronger in this case, explaining the 
overall lower rates of reported bribes in this survey. - If so the, experts’ guess-mates may not 
be so wrong after all? Alternatively, by deliberately searching for corrupt transactions the 
selection bias in Blundo and Olivier de Sardhan’s project may have become so serious that it 
seriously overestimates the prevalence of petty corruption. Alternatively, as suggested above, 
their beliefs may not reflect actual frequencies, but the frequency of concerns, suspicions and 
deliberations about corruption showing their omnipresence. 
 
Whatever may finally prove to be closest to the truth, it may suffice here to point out that so 
far, we have empirical grounds for the claims that: 
• Petty corruption varies significantly across African countries and across the differ-
ent public administrations. 
• Petty corruption is, however, a common feature of citizen- public official transac-
tions in most African countries and in most administrations inside any given coun-
try. 
• The mechanics and forms of motivation of petty corrupt acts and transactions ap-
pear quite similar in the different African countries as does their distribution where 
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the police or tax administrations have the highest incidence while post offices and 
primary schools have the lowest. (The extensive embezzlement of school resources 
documented by PETS was mainly performed at local political levels). 
• Petty corruption appears to be more prevalent in African than other comparable 
countries.  
 
 
8.  Why so high incidence of street level corruption in many Sub-Saharan countries? 
From one point of view, this may not be such an interesting question at all. If we assume that 
most individuals are pursuing their private economic interests everywhere, as we do in neo-
classical economics, they should be expected to participate in corruption at every opportunity. 
The question then is how many opportunities that arise and how easy it is to get away with it. 
There is no reason to believe that opportunities are more numerous in African countries than 
elsewhere at the moment32 , but most states in Africa are considered relatively weak. If so, 
that should apply to their monitoring apparatuses too. Corruption should then be more com-
mon in African countries simply because it is easier to get away with it there. Hence, high 
levels of corruption could simply be explained by weak states.  
                                                
 
But extensive corruption is one of the major characteristics of a weak state, so without intro-
ducing more distinct hypotheses about the way states operate, how their agents interact, we 
have not reached much further. Moreover, the assumption about pure income maximisation is 
too extreme. Corruption is not sufficiently common and varies too much to validate it.  
 
To start to explain the incidence of petty corruption in the African countries it may prove 
fruitful at first to abstract from the large scale corrupt transactions where elaborate organisa-
tions, hundreds of millions of US$ and high level politicians are involved. Blundo and Olivier 
de Sardhan (2006: 48) has argued that it is possible to some extent to abstract from the politi-
cal level: 
 
 
32 A couple of decades ago the number of public officials in many African countries was large compared to the 
size of their economies. This could give rise to a high number of opportunities compared to the size of total 
populations, but the size of the public apparatuses today is not excessive today Goldsmith (2000). Large scale 
retrenchment of the state apparatus has taken place in many African counties. This process in Malawi has been 
described lively in Anders (2005). In this case it appears to have gone hand in hand with increasing corruption 
rates, that retrenchment may have stimulated. 
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even if the visibility and the forms taken by corruption tend to depend on the spe-
cific nature of different types of political regime, no single type, be it authoritarian 
or pluralist, military or civil, is more likely than the others to engender corruption. 
 
That is, petty corruption is operating much in the same way in the fairly democratic Senegal, 
in Benin that has had a Marxist regime for long and in the more “traditional” regimes of Ni-
ger. Customs officers, for example, were everywhere behaving in very similar manners. That 
the best approach to any explanation of corruption is from the starting point of a regular citi-
zen has also been argued by Bayart (1993: 238) : “Contrary to the popular image of the inno-
cent masses, corruption and predatoriness are not found exclusively amongst the powerful. 
Rather, they are modes of social and political behaviour shared by a plurality of actors on 
more or less a great scale.”  
 
The fact that the institutional forms of petty corruption are the same and frequent and inde-
pendent of the political forms of rule, may allow us to abstract temporarily from the latter 
when analysing petty corruption. Since states are directed from above, however, it is highly 
unlikely that the incidence of petty corruption in reality will be uninfluenced by the ways the 
political system work. 
 
 
8.1  Distribution of different modes of micro-coordination and petty corruption 
In order to understand what may be somewhat exceptional with (petty) corruption in African 
countries, we may backtrack a little. In Andvig (2006) I have argued that one approach to 
explain corruption as well some of the concern about it, is to note that citizens have available 
only a limited set of modes of micro-coordination. In order to understand petty corruption, we 
need to look at three.33 
 
A mode of micro-coordination specifies a set of rules for the engagement between at least 
two persons, a decision-making, information and motivational structure guiding the actions of 
the agents operating in that mode. The ones we are going to look at here is  
1)  Bureaucratic modes of transaction, which still direct most private and public output in 
modern societies. Here is specified a set of positions, to which is allocated a set of tasks, 
a decision-making structure where superiors may give orders to incumbents of lower-
level positions, formal prescriptions for which position may interact with which, rules 
                                                 
33 Hence, I will not discuss the political modes of coordination I outlined there. 
 32
for remuneration, and so on. Formally, the main motivation is obedience to superiors’ 
orders and empathy for the organization’s aims.  
2)  Family-friendship coordination is a transaction mode where personal links between 
the individuals involved are the key. For example, if altruism is involved, that altruism 
should only apply to a single person as a close friend, a wife or lover. If generalized, it 
may even lose value. While often demanding rough long-run reciprocity, the exchange 
in values should not be too finely calculated in people’s personal space, at least not in 
the short run. In large clan structures the personal link between the participants in the 
transaction will not imply that they know each other personally, only that there is a par-
ticular, defined and mutually recognized kin tie that makes them behave differently in-
side compared to outside of the dyad. While friendship relations are horizontal (but may 
be asymmetric) the family relations can often be hierarchical. If so, the superior/inferior 
positions are not formally independent of the personal ties involved, but defined by 
them. Supply of public goods have often been organized on that basis. 
3)  The market coordination mode is like the bureaucratic mode, but unlike the family-
friendship mode, in the sense that personal ties between the participants should in prin-
ciple be immaterial. For example, the price charged should ideally be the same whether 
you sell a good to friend or foe. Like friendship coordination, but unlike hierarchy, the 
relationships between participants are basically horizontal. Economic gain is the main 
motivation, whether that is the private motivation of the individual participants or it is 
on behalf of a hierarchy. Most large market transactions are taking place across hierar-
chies or family units. Note that inside a hierarchy the members’ market transactions 
when acting as members will be centrally controlled. Neither personalized nor general-
ized altruism is normally any significant motivation, as it may become in political or 
family-friendship transactions. Unlike family-friendship transactions the exchange of 
values in market transactions should reflect finely calculated reciprocity. If not, one 
party is either exploited or cheated. 
 
In different societies the actual distribution of transactions across modes may differ as well as 
the citizens’ views about where and how strict the proper division between modes should be. 
In many situations strong normative views may be held. For example, in most societies prosti-
tution is considered as an improper intrusion of the market mode into the sphere of family-
friendship activities, but the line may be more or less blurred and the crossing more or less 
frowned upon. In the case of prostitution it is obvious that a crossing of the spheres of friend-
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ship-family and marked transactions may be directly profitable. The regular bribing of public 
bureaucrats has a similar structure. Here it is the market mode that intrudes in the bureaucratic 
modes of coordination. Certain spheres of bureaucratic decisions should be isolated from the 
sphere of markets. That is also a key feature of a Weber state.  
 
Fredrik Barth (1967) analyses a more complex case where some, and different from the usual 
ones operating in modern economies, normative restrictions on what is the proper field for 
market transaction are combined with non-normative restrictions to create spheres between 
different forms of economic activities that proved very profitable to break.34  He analyses a 
Sudanese Fur village economy where local labour might not be bought in a market, due to 
ethical or status restrictions. The major food crop may only be eaten locally due to high costs 
of transport, a restriction evidently of a non-normative kind. Millet could either be consumed 
directly or used as input in beer brewing. Beer may only be brewed by a wife. While transport 
costs for beer were not so high compared to its value, a regular market for it was not allowed 
to arise. Selling beer became a form of prostitution, since beer was so personal. Beer might, 
however, be used as a necessary input for work parties both in the millet and - it was discov-
ered – in the tomato fields. Unlike millet, dried tomatoes could be sold and transported catch-
ing high prices. This is discovered by a Sudanese village equivalent of the lobbyist/consultant 
in the shape of an outside Arabic entrepreneur with considerable transport capacity. He is al-
lowed to settle with his wife who makes beer for work parties in the tomato fields and he sells 
dried tomatoes with considerable profit. In fact he earns twenty times the regular earnings on 
the field. By breaking spheres, he creates a Fur-kind equivalent to corruption, a local labour 
market.  
 
Like the Fur local allocation of labour, a modern Weber-like state is based on an exception-
ally sharp division between the different modes of transaction, a division determined by a set 
of fairly unambiguous laws or rules. Regular bribing means that bureaucratic decisions are 
bought and sold, that is, the market mode is intruding into the fields of bureaucratic mode. 
Rules are also working to establish barriers the other way. Commands by state officials di-
rected against the public and outside their legally stipulated ones for the official in question, 
are prohibited. But rules may be broken, and more easily so when they can not be formulated 
                                                 
34 I discuss this case here because it makes it possible to look at key aspects of the Weber state in relation to 
which corrupt behaviour normally is defined with a different set of normative glasses. 
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too clearly, as they may not in the case of the police. A profitable form of transgression in this 
direction is what we have defined as extortion. 
 
Where the lines actually are drawn in the case of modern states, may differ substantially 
across countries, however. Some standardization has taken place. The scope of market trans-
actions has increased while the scope of bureaucratic transactions has decreased almost eve-
rywhere, including in most African states. And nowhere do we find the vast scope for bureau-
cratic transactions as we did under the former socialist countries. The legal expansion of mar-
ket transactions connected to the supply of public goods has been going together with in-
creased concern for the illegal intrusions of the market mode, for corruption.  
 
What about the family friendship modes? To erect barriers against their intrusions into bu-
reaucracy from the outside is also part and parcel of the construction of Weber-like states: and 
a clear-cut field of bureaucratic decisions. As argued in Andvig and Moene (1994) this state 
form may be quite fragile. Not only may it be invaded from the outside by the market mode. 
Family-friendship mode is an even more frequent intruder. Moreover, the hierarchic forms of 
the family-friendship mode have historically been much longer the basis for the internal op-
eration of the state than the impersonal bureaucratic mode and may still be able to completely 
drive out the bureaucratic mode in so called patrimonial states).35 
 
Like the situation in the Darfur mountain villages of Barth, the present-day family-friendship- 
hierarchy-market barriers of the Weber state would not only give rise to forces that undermine 
them directly through illegal, corrupt means – like the selling of beer – or more roundabout 
legal strategies may evolve. If a sufficient number of outside or inside entrepreneurs are at-
tracted, we may surmise that the legal roundabouts to circumvent the barriers will break them 
down and making way for more direct, formerly corrupt transactions: The women may sell 
beer freely and the men (and women) buy field hands.  
                                                 
35 Note that corruption may occur in such systems too. The ethical concerns may at a deeper level be closely 
related, but the acts considered corrupt may be the opposite. A fascinating aspect of corruption is that whatever 
the transactional structure, a corrupt act is when an individual further his own private interest against some form 
of common good. That is, it reflects a perennial dilemma in human behaviour: Should I further the interest of 
myself or the group in the cases when they conflict? Consider a high-ranking official in a state when the top 
leader shifts. According to the ethics of a Weber-state he should now shifts his loyalty to the new incumbent 
leader, not in secret support the old. If he does, he is disloyal, and maybe led into corrupt acts if the former boss 
tempt him into acts that will work against the new leadership. In a system based on personal loyalty, however, 
such a shift will be considered disloyal, a corrupt act where the official reneges on his duty to the old leader for 
serving his own private advantage: keeping his job. Note that embezzlement will be corruption under both sets of 
ethics.  
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 While not corruption in the strict sense, since no hierarchies or political agencies are involved, 
the case illustrates the point that the set of market transactions in any given society is likely to 
be contained by a set of rules or norms whose very existence makes them profitable to break. 
Rules against corruption are one such line containing market transactions. The Sudan case 
also illustrates the fact that where the line is drawn, may be quite arbitrary, but have important 
economic consequences. Hence, in the case of corruption, it is difficult to define any action as 
intrinsically corrupt. Corruption has to relate to a given set of legal rules or shared norms.  
 
 
8.2  How conflicting specification of coordination modes may give rise to corruption  
While a wide variety of institutional patterns in family organization may be found in the dif-
ferent African countries and between districts inside countries, most express strong family 
values. Having constructed an index of the strength of family values based on questions from 
the World Value Survey, Alesina and Guiliano (2007: 41) found that the two countries from 
Sub- Saharan Africa they had in their sample (Nigeria and Zimbabwe) expressed the greatest 
beliefs in family ties. Given the large share of rural employment, the small scale of most in-
dustrial enterprises, it is evident that a larger share of production in African countries is also 
family-organised than in other regions. Somehow it appears reasonable that if there is some 
special mechanism at work in African countries that may be related to the institutional pat-
terns of family organisations and/or its colonial history.  
 
One mechanism is related to the fact that the proper field for the family mode in much African 
ideology is much wider than in the standard European view. This leads it into overlapping 
(and therefore potential conflict) with both the proper field of the market mode and the bu-
reaucratic mode, when looked at from a Weber or OECD point of view. The way the family 
mode transgresses the bureaucratic mode is simple and direct: it leads to a form of patrimonial 
governance (Medard, 2002). When the family mode and market mode conflict, the conflict 
may give rise to complex brokerage and spill over into a conflict between the market and bu-
reaucratic mode, that is, corruption.  
 
To get a grasp on some of the mechanisms involved, let us take a look into the processes of 
land allocation and corruption in Kenya. Here all the three modes are in conflict. I will first 
focus on some processes at the lower, local level. This is a case where two legal systems of 
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land ownership are allowed to co-exist for a prolonged period. Moreover, the modern bureau-
cratic modes of transactions are allowed to have considerable feedback on the family-based 
systems for allocating land. In fact, the principles of family-based land tenure even became 
formulated by formal, bureaucratic procedures. Nevertheless, the ruling normative conflicts 
about the principles for land allocation have contributed both to extensive corruption in the 
land allocation processes and to embezzlement of both public and so-called tribal land.  
 
The key event giving rise to this situation was the rapid introduction of formal, rule-based 
bureaucratic procedures in former non-state areas at the end of the 19th century when Kenya 
became an English colony. To some degree the two systems of landholding were made com-
patible till the mid 1950s by the colonial bureaucracy applying them to different geographical 
areas: The settler areas, given most of the better agricultural land, were based on English law, 
while the remaining areas were supposed to follow local tribal laws as interpreted by the co-
lonial administration.36  A key modification of the English law was, however, that all land in 
the last analysis belonged to the crown, not only as a legal theory, but in practice. Another 
important feature was the considerable bureaucratic powers that were handed over to the des-
ignated middlemen between the systems, the chiefs. They were supposed to control the fam-
ily-based, native economies on behalf of the colonial administration. 37  A key modification of 
most of the tribal laws compared to actual pre-colonial land tenure was to overemphasise the 
collective aspects of ownership, which made it easier to give specific pieces of land to settlers.  
 
Since the mid-1950s there has been an explicit aim of moving towards individual, private 
ownership of land (clearly formulated before independence in the so-called Swynnerton plan). 
It was accepted by the post-colonial government. Even if the professed desired flow of owner-
ship changes is toward individual private ownership, the de facto flow in certain areas may 
even in some cases be in the direction of traditional forms. Still 70% - 80 % of land is held 
under customary systems of ownership and use, while 10 % is classified as government land 
and only 20% is held privately (Njuguna & Baya, 2001). The customary systems differ ac-
cording to tribe and the kind of land used. Some indigenous systems of land allocation, such 
as the ones of the Kikuyu tribe, traditionally allowed a decentralised system of ownership of 
                                                 
36 This is many ways an over simplification. For example, large parts of the coastal area were subject to a third 
set of laws. It is, of course, impossible to go into the historical complexity of the development here. A useful 
survey of the evolution of agrarian law in Kenya is Okuth-Ogendo (1991)  
37 Mamdani (1996) claims that the despotic nature of the local rule has had lasting effects on post colonial gov-
ernance. 
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land bordering on private ownership (Kenyatta, 1938). The same applies for example to the 
Mbeere (Glazier, 1985).38  Nevertheless, any sale of land had to be confirmed by a council of 
elders in a boundary ceremony. Sales like any other method of transfer should conform to a 
family-based set of norms. 
 
The contradictory tenure principles made scope for embezzlement at both the bureaucratic 
and family-based ends. Note that the areas under customary use are also owned by the gov-
ernment, and hence may ptentially be reallocated under some bureaucratic rule. Let us first 
look at the family end. Glazier (1985) describes several mechanisms of land grabbing at the 
local level as at least in part triggered of by the prospects of individual ownership to land 
when principles of land ownership conflict.  
 
One source of conflict is conflicts between ownership claims based at different tiers of the 
“traditional” patrilineal family structure. Since the formal bureaucracy has accepted extensive 
landholding rights at the high, clan-level, and tied clans to geographical areas, a piece of land 
may at the same time “belong” to a clan and to a member of another clan who also “owns” it 
by being in his and his narrow patrilineage’s possession. Here “modern” bureaucracy has cre-
ated contradicting traditional principles. In many cases the contradiction are solved by either 
bribing the courts, the council of elders, or both. That is a market transaction. 
 
Glacier (1985) notes that as land scarcity developed, the competition for land combined by the 
multiple ownership rights at both the individual and clan level was reinforced by the individu-
alisation process: If you did not make a claim for your land, others would do so since several 
were likely to have some claimable rights. Given the resources necessary, both the legal costs 
and the bribes necessary for witnesses and judges, individual claims would often be formu-
lated at the clan level. In fact, the competition for land in effect partly created the clans since 
both financial costs and witness statements needed a pooling of resources (Glazier, 1985). The 
leaders of the clan’s litigation process would then at times use their leadership positions to 
embezzle parts of the land won for themselves or their close family. The possibility of selling 
                                                 
38 One of the reasons why individualized land-holding was not accepted by the colonial authorities was that 
would make it illegal to expropriate native land and sell/give it to settlers (Okuth-Ogendo:54).. 
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it sometimes increased the motivation and the likelihood of successful embezzlement, since a 
sale by itself could make the ownership rights of the new owners somewhat more secure.39 
 
This situation points to another source of conflict: market and family transactions would in 
many cases lead to conflicting claims. To put it simply, any transfer of land, such as a sale, 
should be confirmed by councils representing the traditional authority, but that authority could 
not really give away its rights of transfer, so if the buyer of the land planned to sell it, that 
should also be confirmed by the council representing the former “seller”. Either the confirma-
tion was granted or not, a sale could easily be contested. The decisions of the councils have 
frequently been influenced by bribes. (Okuro, 2002). Even so, the incentives of selling and 
buying land with questionable ownership existed since the very act of buying sometimes 
could give the new owner more protection than the seller had. The market for land as it 
evolved undoubtedly got some “lemon” characteristics (Akerlof, 1970) where possessors 
would try to sell the land with the most questionable ownership characteristics. The outcome 
was a further stimulus to land disputes and the bribing of the traditional councils as well as the 
formal courts and a thinning out of the market itself.40 
 
In the larger cases of embezzlement at the clan level, the leaders of the land claim organisa-
tions were often chiefs. Given their middleman position, they could convert (and misuse) their 
formal bureaucratic power into power in their family networks and in the inter-clan competi-
tion, and then embezzle “crown” land, in the first instance for the clan. If they did so, it would 
be family-based embezzlement. Then they could embezzle the new clan land for their own 
possession. The existence of the traditional family-based rules for land allocation made it eas-
ier for the chiefs to embezzle land for themselves since they could disguise the nature of the 
transaction.41   
 
The coexistence of different land allocation principles have certainly opened up new opportu-
nities of commercial corruption through the bribing of “traditional” councils and modern 
courts. Commercial corruption has also in other ways been instrumental in moving a piece of 
                                                 
39 Glazier reports that if a land holder was able to get a formal sector loan on his land, by itself reduced the con-
testability of the ownership. 
40 Ensminger (1997) notes the surprising decline in formal land titling and reemergence of traditional tenure in 
Kenya. She explains it mainly through the high transaction costs of the titling process itself including its eventual 
bribe costs, particularly for small holdings. If the market for land thins out the need for registration also declines.  
41Here again I mainly follow Glazier. Later the chiefs’ role probably has become less important and the key 
actors have probably been the Ministry of Lands and Settlement, the Provincial Administrations and KANU 
politicians. Okuro (2002) gives a glimpse into more recent processes. 
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land from one rule system to another and thereby aided in hiding the nature of a land grabbing 
transaction.  
 
So far we have seen land grabbing from the family end and the chiefs have been mainly seen 
as embedded in their kin network, although their power is based on a modern state. Embez-
zlement may, however, arise at the purely modern, bureaucratic or political end. In the sim-
plest case a public official may just grab a piece of land owned by the government, maybe 
bribe a few officials who register the land titles, pay a nominal fee and then claim private 
ownership. To hide the transaction the land is likely to be titled to friends or family, however. 
This is pure embezzlement of a formal organisation, but it is made possible by the public 
ownership of land. That public ownership may sometimes be due to the absence of private 
ownership, again due to the tribal possession.  
 
In other cases the official may be bribed by outsiders to gain ownership to the public land.42 
In practice the deals may often be more complex playing on interactions between modern and 
family-based transactions, and involving some kind of reciprocity or payment for political 
services. For example, an official who has his family origin in tribe A may have to make some 
reallocation disposals in an area of tribe B, and he may give a slice of that area to an official 
from B who is in a position to make some reallocation disposals in A, of which he gives a 
slice to the official from A. Here “traditional” values play a role because the A-property is 
more worth for the A-official and the B-property for the B-official. The reason is that the risk 
of counterclaims is higher when owning private property in “foreign” lands. In addition, this 
two-ways gifts-giving reduces the probability of being caught in simple land grabbing. 
 
Even more involved procedures may arise in areas which are under both customary tenure and 
some bureaucratic rule. For example, by turning on a sleeping bureaucratic rule, squatters 
holding land in a traditional way may be chased away. That achieved, the land has come un-
der effective hierarchical, state control. Again, the bureaucratic rule may be turned off again, 
and the land may be given away/sold below market price for a bribe or officials may alterna-
tively embezzle the land themselves. After either operation the land may become private 
property, and thereby increase in value. Officials may transfer land from the individual title-
holder to a traditional group- holder, back to government land and from there into his private 
                                                 
42 The giving away of the Westland market and parts of Karura forests in Nairobi are well-known examples 
where this type of transaction is suspected (Klopp, 2000).  
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“pocket”. While commercial in form, the ultimate motivation for most of these transactions 
may rather be short-term political control. 
 
The coexistence of different judicial principles stimulated corruption and embezzlement by 
intensifying the external incentives for land grabbing and by increasing the number of possi-
bilities where the opportunities arose. Their contradictions may also have done something to 
the workings of intrinsic motivation, leading to some kind of anomie effects43  For example, if 
a council of elders has to decide whether a piece of land should be given either to A or B, but 
tradition told that A should have the x-rights and B the y-rights, either decision would be 
wrong. Then it might as well be given to the one who paid the largest bribe. When consider-
ing one claim based on patrilineal rights and another claim on a preceding sales history, if not 
believing in either system of property rights, the judge may as well decide on the basis of 
bribe size. Since anomie both affect the intrinsic, fixed moral “costs” of a corrupt transaction 
of the perpetrators of corruption and the most important part of its monitoring apparatus 
through its effects on other members of the organisation, it is an important, but difficult-to-
trace mechanism.  
 
The focus in this section has been on a theoretical analysis of fairly “petty” corruption in land 
administration. In the following I will look more closely at land grabbing at the political level 
and present some empirical evidence. 
 
 
9.  Forms of corruption at the political level 
So far we have focused on so called petty corruption, interactions between lower placed pub-
lic officials, citizens and enterprises. However disorganized, a state has some ability to cen-
tralise decisions and resources. Each state has a single government army; the small amounts 
of taxes that are collected from single citizens and enterprises are aggregated into consider-
able sums even for the poorest state. Anything aggregate, may be manipulated to a consider-
able degree, even stolen from the centre. The agents who are in position to fight for the con-
trol of the centre or possessing that control are the politicians. By moving around the apex of 
                                                 
43 Glazier (1985: 229) cites an early report of pre-1910 council response: “the influence of the chief seems usu-
ally to have been dominant. The elders who were traditionally qualified to exercise judicial functions were 
driven into an attitude of apathy, of sulky acquiescence or even hostility.” 
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the centralised system as a state is, they have key roles in how the public apparatus respond to 
citizens including the petty corruption of the lower ranks. 
 
Moreover, their position at or around the supply centre of collective goods and collective ac-
tion, the specific forms of their competition, give scope for forms of corrupt actions or trans-
actions not available to other public officials. At the same time the form of political competi-
tion impacts the incentives and the restraints. In particular, to form a winnable coalition, 
bribes of either friends or foes or both may be necessary. The forms of competition will hinge 
upon how the constituency looks like: the whole population, mainly urban dwellers, mainly 
one tribe or all, mainly the rich or educated? The competition may either be peaceful or poten-
tially violent, intra-palace or in open fields such as in democratic elections.  
 
 
9.1  Political bribes under potentially violent tribal competition 
In a number of African countries may the potential of violent opposition impact the incentives 
and effects of political bribing. Alas, the number of actual conflicts on the continent makes 
this sometimes a realistic situation. Although scarcely applying the term “corruption” Jean-
Paul Azam (2001, 2006, 2008) has analysed it in several models. He focuses on two groups 
that have their organizational basis and legitimacy outside the state apparatus, but competing 
for its control.44  He sometimes looks at the extreme case where one group is in temporary 
control and may employ the state apparatus (particularly its military part) to further its group 
interests. The other group – the “opposition” – may be wholly denied access to the state; or 
the controlling group may transfer a share of the public goods, public positions and public 
income to members of the opposition group. In many African countries, some form of collec-
tive instrument for gaining access to land is also frequently involved: a share of land is put in 
the pot, increasing the value of the prize gained or lost in the extra-state group competition. 
This is an institutional feature that may stimulate both corruption and armed fighting. After a 
                                                 
44 The following exposition represents an interpretation of his models. The key point here is that when the central 
management of the state is made to serve the aims of outside groups, high corruption levels (as seen from the 
perspective of the state) can be expected. Seen from the point of view of the competing groups themselves, the 
normative grid fixed by the state may appear arbitrary, and rules will be violated as part of the fight. Seen from 
the point of view of the state, many of these violations represent corruption. Relation-based corruption will be 
especially prominent. The likely effects of corruption on conflict probability would hinge upon how its compo-
nents are related to the group struggle. Azam considers transfers mainly from the perspective of the competing 
extra-state groups, and so corruption disappears from view. 
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group has gained control, many of these transactions will be corrupt when regarded from the 
vantage point of view of the formal state. 
 
Azam assumes that the opposition group has the potential capacity to organize a violent rebel-
lion, whether or not it currently has actual control of some instruments of violence. Hence, the 
models assume the existence of at least two centrally directed organizations that may operate 
behind the back of the formal public institutions, sometimes using the latter as instrument. 
Such ethnic groups, “clans”, “tribes”, even “nationalities” are relation-based and may supply 
individual insurance, mutually supporting values, and so on, not only collective decision-
making units that “produce” violence. Azam’s models have mainly West African experience 
in mind, but such groups are quite prevalent in other African countries that are characterized 
by relation-based (family) production and insurance systems. They seem relevant to the post 
2007-election outbursts of violence in Kenya 
 
As just mentioned, Azam assumes that there exists a coalition of ethnic groups that controls 
the state. That group relates to another coalition of ethnic groups that might rebel, applying 
military force, like the governing coalition. The controlling coalition may spend the income 
from the state, T, on military force, D, on the potential rebels, G, or on itself, A (i.e. T = D + 
G + A).45  The conflict between the controlling and potentially rebelling coalition is modelled 
as a lottery where the probability that the rebels will succeed and take control of the state is 
determined by the resources of force the rebels are able to muster, compared to the control 
coalition. The model addresses potential civil war situations. The force gathered by the rebels, 
F, must exceed a certain threshold before the probability of their winning can rise above zero. 
Unless there are some pre-existing groups with a certain geographical concentration, this 
threshold may be passed only with difficulty.46   
 
Seen from the point of view of the ruling group – which owes its legitimacy to conditions 
outside the state – we could interpret G as a bribe to the rebel group to dissuade it from arm-
                                                 
45 A is not made explicit, but without it the discussion would not make much sense. A may be interpreted vari-
ously, but a likely interpretation would be as a kind of rent that accrues to the leadership of the state-controlling 
coalition through its “ownership” of the state. It is reasonable to assume that a large share of A represents cor-
ruption.  
46 That is when passing the threshold of civil war-like situation. The start-up groups may be very small like Tay-
lor’s start-up group initiating the civil war in Liberia in 1989. They may have many different forms of glue and 
test out the possibility of passing the threshold by trial and error. I am not aware of any systematic study of such 
start-up groups, where both failures and successes are recorded. When reaching the data threshold for the civil 
war definitions they have already become successful.  
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ing. Depending on circumstances it might “bribe” the leadership or the followers in the poten-
tial rebel coalition, using the state as the obvious instrument of redistribution47 . These bribes 
would tend to reduce the possibility of conflict. G corruption would reduce the rebels’ incen-
tive for seizing power since they have already received the part of the rent that would eventu-
ally accrue them as power-holders, and their own expected future net rents would be reduced 
since, if they won, they would expect to have to pay a similar amount to the opposition in 
order to maintain control. 
 
If, on the other hand, the ruling coalition spends its net state rents on itself, the other form of 
corruption (A); that would clearly stimulate conflicts since (1) it would leave the controlling 
group with a smaller, less well-armed military force, thereby increasing the probability that 
rebels might win, which in turn would raise the probability of the outbreak of conflict, and (2) 
it would increase (or keep) the size of the catch that rebels might grab, and hence strengthen 
their incentives for rebelling. How the corrupt income is spent is crucial for its impact on con-
flicts. 
 
However, there is a problem in interpreting G simply as a flow of corrupt income within this 
model, since it then may easily be adjusted upwards or downwards. This is problematic be-
cause the ruling coalition then cannot pre-commit to G and let it stay at that level whatever 
the level of force, F, chosen by the rebel coalition. That is, the ruling coalition cannot pre-
commit G to the level necessary for the rebels to decide not to arm. And if it cannot pre-
commit, that means that the government coalition has an incentive to spend all its income 
either on its own military forces, or grab the rent for its own use, depending on the F it ob-
serves. If it observes F = 0, the government coalition will keep so much of the rent itself that 
the rebels will arm in any case, so as to catch that large rent – and no peace-inducing, arms-
saving corruption will emerge. 
 
To apply redistribution as an instrument to prevent civil war, the government coalition has to 
pre-commit, making it unable to adjust the level of G to the observed level of the force-
relevant expenditures controlled by opposition groups. This pre-commitment might be done in 
several ways – for example, by allocating public investment in ways that may favour the po-
                                                 
47 While seen from the perspective of the ruling group, G represents bribes, from the point of view of the Weber 
grid some of the redistribution may not be bribes but legitimate expenditures like investment in schools, roads or 
health clinics in “rebel” areas, in addition to the regular bribes of the members of the opposition. 
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tential rebel coalition. When schools and health clinics are built in rebel-controlled areas they 
are there, and it is hard to refuse to pay the teachers and doctors. It takes time before roads in 
rebel areas become totally unusable. This was the form of pre-commitment Azam had in 
mind. The strategy had been applied successfully in Côte d’Ivoire by Houphouët-Boigny. 
While corruption is bound to evolve around the administration of schools and clinics in coun-
tries where corruption is common, most of this form of “bribing” the potential rebel coalition 
would not be deemed “corruption” under a Weber grid.  
 
Another method of pre-commitment more closely tied to corruption in a Weberian sense is to 
allocate a certain number of rent-generating positions (or administrative units) in the govern-
ment to members of the ethnic groups of the opposition coalition.48  In this way, members of 
the opposition can collect their own bribes in the same way as members of the government. 
Here the redistribution of income is by implication.49  It is the members of opposition groups 
holding positions in the state who actually collect the corrupt income. 
 
In another, somewhat more complex model, Azam (2006, simplified in 2008) focuses on the 
relative income-generating versus fighting abilities of the two contesting groups, and models 
more explicitly the credibility of government income transfers. This credibility may now vary 
in degree, but it is still assumed to be exogenous. Azam applies the new set-up to explain why 
a government controlled by a relatively “rich” group may need to redistribute income to the 
“poor” in order to keep the peace. If redistribution becomes less credible, the government will 
have to transfer more; however, if credibility falls below a certain level, the only remaining 
device to keep the peace or win the fight is the accumulation of force. If, by contrast, the 
poorer group controls the government, it is likely not to redistribute to the potential rebels, but 
to rely on military force. Hence, redistribution including corruption is an issue mainly when 
the richer coalition is in power. Since this redistribution will have a large share of corrupt 
components, ruling coalitions from richer areas may tend to be more corrupt (and perhaps also 
win democratic contests when transfer in corrupt items increases their chances of winning), 
                                                 
48 According to widespread rumours in Kenya around 2000 Kikuyus were allowed to keep all the rents they 
could catch in the Nairobi Town Council during the Kalenjin rule of former president Daniel Arap Moi. This and 
other power-sharing devices may partly explain the absence of any serious violent rebel organizations during his 
rule, except for the coup attempt of 1982. The present grand coalition after the violent outbursts in the winter 
2008 suggests extensive bribe-sharing arrangements (Mars Group. 
49 If the positions were not secure, or control of the units could easily be revoked, such licenses to bribe could, of 
course, not be applied in any pre-commitment strategy. It is easier to dish out positions as part of a pre-
commitment strategy when the potential rebel groups are tied to geographical areas. 
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whereas ruling coalitions from poorer areas will tend towards military forms of ruling with 
less corruption and more use of force.  
 
As in the preceding model, corruption may increase or reduce the probability of conflict, de-
pending on whether the corrupt income is collected by officials from the poor or by the gov-
ernment coalition, assuming that the rulers are from the rich area. On the other hand, the 
model suggests another mechanism that points to conflict-enhancing effects of corruption. 
While an exogenous parameter in the model, the level of credibility is likely to be influenced 
by the rates of corruption (according to the Weber grid). Whatever level of redistribution from 
the power-holding group the two coalitions have agreed upon, it is meant to be implemented 
through the state apparatus. If that is permeated by corruption, the credibility of any commit-
ment will be low. Hence, when the power is held by the richer group, a high level of corrup-
tion will go together with a high likelihood of civil war. 
 
Part of the motivation for Azam’s models is to understand the situation when contesting eth-
nic groups are fighting for state power while also possessing their own decision mechanisms 
for redistribution, production and allocation of publicly delivered goods and services, such as 
security, working outside the state apparatus. While this is not modelled explicitly, in order to 
understand whether the government coalition will choose to grant licenses to bribe or actually 
deliver goods and services to rebel group members, it may be important to distinguish be-
tween the leadership and the ordinary members of the coalition.  
 
If the key problem is to prevent the leadership of the rebel coalition from opting for conflict, 
the licence to bribe is likely to be preferred, since that will be to their immediate advantage. 
Schools and health clinics, however, will be more to the advantage of the rank and file, and 
will act to prevent them from joining a rebellion. It may also weaken the rebel leaders’ hold 
on the group through patronage, since they receive less in bribes to redistribute.  
 
That would also happen with the licenses to bribe extraction, if corruption has become a cause 
for policy dissatisfaction. When the leaders indulge in corruption, this may weaken the moti-
vation of the rank and file to join them in a rebellion. In this case, the rulers might bribe the 
rebel leaders in order to prevent their rank and file from joining. If, on the other hand, the re-
bel followers are less concerned about their leaders’ corruption, this could backfire: earning 
corrupt income gives the leaders scope for their own redistribution to followers, which may 
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boost their power and popularity. However, if it is the poorer group that gains power, it will 
be less able to redistribute rents to the out-of power group and will have to rely more on force 
to stay in position. The last model is clearly inspired by the 2002–03 rebellion in the Ivory 
Coast and the post-World War II history of Nigeria. Alternating between rulers from richer 
areas with some democratic credentials but characterized by extreme corruption, and military 
rulers based on support in poorer area almost seems to have been the rule. Aspects of Kenya’s 
history may also fit this pattern as pointed out by Azam (2008). 
 
Azam’s articles are mainly theoretical. Particularly interesting, in my view, are his ideas about 
how the conflict potential of an economy could have important effects on whether or not open 
conflict may emerge. Among the mechanisms working during peace but likely to be influ-
enced by the shadows of war are the various forms of corruption. If the level of corruption is 
high in a period prior to a civil war, this may be because it is an active cause – or, conversely, 
it may be conflict-reducing, but not sufficiently so. If it is low, this could be because the fear 
of conflict may induce the ruling coalition to collect less of its state control rents for private 
consumption, but to spend these rents on weapons, schools or health clinics instead.  
 
A more direct way for the government group would be to bribe potential violent opposition 
groups directly for not opposing the regime, but to serve it. A variation of this strategy can be 
discerned in the handling of the famous “Bakassi boys” from South-Eastern Nigeria. In an 
interesting article based on extensive and obviously dangerous field work, Meagher (2007) 
describes how this group of young men, originally shoe producers, arose because the authori-
ties were unable of containing violent crime in their area. The police were too corrupt and 
inefficient to contain the violent and frequent crime that developed making life unbearable. 
The Bakassi boys then arose as a violent vigilance group, ruthless, but honest and outside the 
control of the authorities - partly because it grew extremely popular. It developed into a vio-
lent, uncontrollable and therefore potential political opposition group with violence making 
capabilities. The group was in the end hijacked into the service of established politicians. Key 
leaders were jailed or fraudulently discredited. Then some were bribed, became political cli-
ents, and the remaining parts of the organization were added to the regular police and behaved 
in similar manners. Needless to add their popularity evaporated. 
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9.2  Traces of colonialism: The large scale land grabbing in Kenya 
As mentioned in the introduction, the obvious change-minimising transition from colonial to 
independent rule was to supplant the governor with a president. That was what happened in 
many countries after a while. This implied that at least the formal decision-making power was 
exceptionally centralised in the majority of African states, including Kenya. More specifi-
cally, it was inherent in colonial expansion, particularly when so rapid as the ones that took 
place in East Africa, that land allocation rights were centralised in the governor. This was 
again transferred to the president.50   
 
Decision –making on land allocation was of course not the only decision- making resources 
that was centralised in the presidency which frequently could give rise to elaborate schemes 
of embezzlement and other forms of political corruption. Here I will focus on centralized land 
grabbing, however, since it illustrates fairly clearly a distinctly African turn on otherwise 
fairly general forms of resource-demanding political competition. Aspects of the customary 
land ownership systems in African countries had also a role to play, together with the fact that 
a larger share of the population remains rural there than elsewhere. The political forms of em-
bezzlement, extortion and stealing of land deserves separate analysis. In Kenya it has been 
extensive.  
 
The land in Kenya is classified into three or four types types: trust lands (80%, mostly arid 
land) that in principle are allocated to some form of local groups that should distribute and 
redistribute land according to ruling local customs, alienated public land, (land already allo-
cated to some public purpose), non-alienated public land and private land. In the final analy-
sis all land is government land, however. The president may in principle hand over non-
alienated public land, reclassify trust land to alienated public land, and reclassify alienated to 
non-alienated public land. In practice, trust land is held by county councils on behalf of the 
local groups and most of the grabbing of rural land has had those as focus.  
 
Unlike many African countries, land scarcity ruled in Kenya already when it became inde-
pendent in 1963. The scarcity was partly induced by European settlers that had chased large 
                                                 
50 In surprising detail the institutional solutions were kept after independence. Regarding allocation of urban 
land, the colonial government had initially applied a auction system, which still is formally the preferred system, 
but it had gone totally out of use during World War II and had in practice been supplanted by a system of direct 
grants by local plot allocation committees. The granting of land was supposed to satisfy a number of public use 
criteria that was partly followed in colonial times, but not any longer (Ndungu Report (2004: 7). The report sug-
gests that the latter method was chosen since it made it easier to redistribute land politically.  
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number of Kenyans away from their land. That process gave in the end rise to the Mau-Mau 
rising in the 1950s. Unlike other freedom struggles the outcome in terms of land for the fight-
ers involved came almost to nothing. The result has become an extremely unequal distribution 
of land and a number of still simmering ethnic conflicts with focus on land distribution. It has 
been reinforced by the later, spectacular land grabbing processes. The violent outburst in 2008 
has made the outside world more aware of them. 
 
In the beginning land grabbing was centralised, political and dominated by a few and large 
decisions made by the president. The most important ones were focused on agriculture. 
Unlike the former British governor, Kenyatta, as an African, had his constituency in Kenya. 
In the end it proved to be narrow, consisting mainly of his family and already well-off Kiku-
yus. Altogether the Kenyatta family got control of about 500 000 hectares of land (Kinyanjui, 
2007: 73). In the early Moi period, the land grabbing was again dominated by a few, but large 
decisions. Not that many agents and transactions seem to have been involved. That was to 
change. 
 
According to Ndungu (2006: 5) while 200 000 illegal titles to land were created between 1962 
and 2002, 98% of those were created between 1986 and 2002. This does not imply that land 
grabbing before 1986 was unimportant. It was in this period that the Moi and Kenyatta fami-
lies acquired their vast land holdings, reinforcing the skewed land distribution initiated by the 
colonial rule. While the higher number of the later instances of land grabbing signals that the 
grabbing process had become more decentralised, a large fraction of it was still located at the 
office of the president and its timing was clearly related to political processes.  
 
Substantiating Klopp (2000) Ndungu confirms (Ndungu, 2006: 4) that the incidence of land 
grabbing started to rise when foreign aid froze in the early 1980s. Land grabbing had grown 
as a substitute for regular patronage, land instead of money was distributed in order to gain 
political support. The combination of economic stagnation of the early 1980s (Mwega and 
Ndung’u, 2008: 328) and the dismantling of a number of price controls (ibid.: 343) may have 
reduced the scope for other forms of patronage. Land grabbing was also less monitored by 
foreign donors. The World Bank may also have been less worried about this corruption proc-
ess from an ideological point of view. Many occurrences could be considered as stealthy 
forms of privatisation 
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The number peaked around election time, another indication of its political patronage charac-
ter. Moreover, Ndungu could document that all major politicians, including Raila Ondinga, 
Moi’s long time enemy, had been involved in the land grabbing (Ndungu report, 2004: 89). 
The methods of land grabbing have varied as have their degree of illegality, size, complexity 
and economic value. Naturally, the easiest objects have already been allocated, so the com-
plexity has increased. 
 
How is land grabbing related to corruption? It is not obvious that the grabbing of land by itself 
is corruption, although a successful operation of some size will normally demand the bribing 
of officials in several public organisations. In most cases, however, the end of the operation is 
that some public or trust lands become private. This may be regarded in two ways. Public land 
may be considered as belonging to the government. In that case, land grabbing may be con-
sidered as an embezzlement process where at least that part of the value of the land that is not 
fed into the public budget, has been embezzled. Another way to look at it - the one the 
Ndungu commission seems to ascribe – is to consider the public land as owned by the public. 
Then this transfer of land into private hands should be looked at as a kind of theft, but a form 
of theft that is tied to the thieves’ positions in the public apparatus. In principle this is the 
same case as a policeman who is in a position to steal from a prisoner. 
 
Particularly in the case regarding trust lands land was also grabbed by extortion – and police-
men often have been guarding the land grabbing incidences receiving some small share. In 
most cases the end situation is again a transfer of land into private ownership. In a few cases, 
however, private ownership has only been an intermediate step where the land then has been 
transferred into the possession of public organisations at above market prices. Here public 
funds only have been embezzled. 
 
An interesting aspect of the history of the land grabbing process in Kenya was the increasing 
number of officials and agencies that have become involved from the 1980s on. While cer-
tainly centrally inspired, it is likely also to reflect a looser, somewhat less authoritarian style 
of government, a loss of discipline. We have seen this described for Malawi in Anders (2005) 
where the more “democratic” style of internal governance (compared to thestricter Banda rule 
went together with increasing employment of (particularly lower ranking ) public officials. 
When discipline was loosened, patronage was broadened. Even if lowly paid, to have a posi-
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tion in government improved your chances to eke out a living – why not supply poor mem-
bers of your family with that possibility, when possible?  
 
As long as it was economically possible a dramatic increase in public employment took place 
in a number of African countries. In countries like Ghana and Nigeria the yearly rate of 
growth in the number of public officials in 1975 - 1983 was 15% (Oluwu, 1993: 232). Decen-
tralised land grabbing started later and lasted longer where it was extensive since it was not 
restrained by the public budgets and foreign donors as the increase in public employees 
through patronage. 
 
The economic values involved in the land grabbing process in Kenya implies that it is proba-
bly the largest, sustained corrupt political corruption process ever taking place in the country. 
Looking only at a handful of fairly recent illegal excisions of forests where the values have 
been estimated to 18.4 billion Ksh (about 260 million US$ or more)by Kenya Land Alliance 
and Kenya National Commission on Human Rights (2006: 1). The basis of information for 
their estimates is in the Ndungu report. And this is only a few of more than 200 000 cases. So 
far, I’m not aware of any attempt to estimate the total value and economic effects of the land 
grabbing patronage, however. Among the fairly obvious effects should be mentioned: 
• Increased depletion of forest land that is exceptionally important ecologically and 
for the local climate in Kenya. 
• Increased inequality of land ownership with its contribution to the number of the 
absolute poor. High tribal antagonisms that have caused costly violent conflicts 
such as the one in early 2008.  
• Reducing the security of land ownership, particularly for the poor. 
•  Worsening of the state of slums in the cities. 
• Worsening traffic solutions in the cities and elsewhere. 
 
– Looking back at our statistics on petty corruption: How will this large political corruption 
process be reflected in the citizen’s reported bribe experiences? Few of the land grabbing 
transactions are likely to be recorded when respondents are asked about their experiences: 
some bribing of courts a police and local administration. The overall structuring process with 
its focus on the president’s office is likely to remain unrecorded.  
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A smaller process of land grabbing has also been analysed for Zambia (Brown, 2005). There 
it was the speeding up the market-based reform of 1995 that increased the incidence of land 
grabbing. The reform intended, inter alia, to make it easier to convert customary to private 
land. One way to do it is to claim some public purpose for buying customary land and making 
it private. The increase in value of the land, if privatised, made for strong incentives for the 
conversion. Frauds and land grabbing became more common. The local chiefs were more 
central than in Kenya and were frequently bribed in order to accept the conversion.  
 
 
9.3 Some other sources of corrupt income at the political level. International aspects 
Most of the sources of corrupt income for politicians are the same in African countries as 
elsewhere and well described in Moody Stuart (1996): illegal commissions on large public 
procurement contracts, consultancies to act as middlemen. He further the sizes of procurement 
contracts and consultancies the different political levels kick in. His description is partly 
based on insider experience from African countries. 
 
In several exceptionally large cases the central bank has been involved: The so-called 
Goldenberg scandal in Kenya from the early 1990s where it has been estimated that the Ken-
yan state was embezzled for an amount between 600 – 1000 million US$ (Warutere, 2005), 
the central Bank of Kenya was heavily involved.. Here an export support scheme organised 
through the bank so that one private firm (Goldenberg) could tap it almost unhindered. The 
profits were then fed back into the political leadership and to a large extent spent on 
nfluenceing the 1992 elections. Presumably, both the political and private agents involved 
transferred something into their private coffers, too. The transaction could alternatively be 
classified as a bribing scheme initiated by private actors or as an embezzlement scheme where 
private agents got some commission to do their part. 
 
The scheme was based on foreign exchange restrictions not at work now. The rationing of 
foreign exchange made central banks once important nexuses for corrupt transactions and 
distribution of patronage in many African countries until the early 1990s. By itself the dis-
mantling of key foreign exchange restrictions was a strong reason to expect corruption to de-
crease in this period. A number of subjective judgments made by experienced observers sug-
gest that the opposite was happening. Other forces were probably stronger. In Kenya we re-
cently got the large so called Anglo-Leasing scandal. This was a case where the officials in-
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volved – mainly politicians – were not satisfied with a commission from the winner of the 
procurement competition. They wanted the whole value of the contract. Roughly that was 
done by inventing a company that was supposed to do the task and locate it abroad in a coun-
try where financial secrets were well protected (Mars Group, 2007), - a real-life emperor’s –
new- clothes- story. Presumably this was easier to implement in a more liberal financial sys-
tem. In Mozambique the privatisation and liberalisation of several banks opened up for a 
widespread of position determined thefts from members of the political elite. (Hanlon, 2004). 
 
 
10. Conclusions  
The key to understand corruption, as I see it, is to understand the character of modern, Webe-
rian states, or private enterprise bureaucracies for that matter. The Weber state is in many 
ways a peculiar construction that relies on sharp barriers between its bureaucratic and political 
transactions on the one hand, and family- friendship and market transactions on the other. Its 
incentive structure is also peculiar in the sense that its officials need some notion of public 
service, some shared aim that motivate them to supply public goods and services.  
 
I share Medard’s (2002) view that when looking for mechanisms that may explain why cor-
ruption levels stay high, maybe higher, and with stronger negative economic effects in most 
African countries than elsewhere, we have too look at reasons why it has proved harder to 
develop a Weber state there than elsewhere.  
 
One prominent reason is the colonial legacy. When transferred to independence, it made state 
policies harsh and power formally centralised. This contributed to a situation where govern-
ments were hold in low esteem in most African countries. Within this shared colonial back-
ground interesting variations may have been at work. Treisman (2000) has some econometric 
results that may suggest that British colonial heritage may yield lower corruption propensities. 
Acemoglu et al (2001) indicate that a large settler population may have been advantageous. 
 
A second set of mechanisms that may have been at work in most African countries, but 
somewhat less elsewhere is the extensive power of kin-based organizations and ideology. 
They intrude more strongly and directly both in the operations of the bureaucracies and poli-
ties. Family ideology also contributes to the low legitimacy of public organization held by 
officials and citizens alike. This makes the mutual, decentralised monitoring among public 
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officials weak. In practice it is this form of monitoring that is likely to be the most efficient 
instrument in preventing corruption proper. If not directed strongly from a centre, it appears 
that in this situation where officials have most of their loyalty outside, centrifugal forces tend 
to operate. When some African states became somewhat less authoritarian, corruption tended 
to have increased. This seems to have been the case at least since the 1990s in Kenya, Malawi 
as well as in Zambia and the Ivory Coast.  
 
The presence of family norms does not imply that the population overall has not accepted at 
all the Weber state ideologically. When asked questions about various forms of nepotism, the 
large majority of the respondents in all the African countries that participated in the Afro-
barometer survey (round 3), considered the nepotism option clearly as morally wrong (Ar-
mah-Attoh et al., 2007: 3). Nor does the absence of Weber state and the presence of a version 
of family ideology, precludes condemnation of many corrupt acts. African peoples as people 
elsewhere have responded strongly against obvious misuse of political power for private ad-
vantage.51   
 
Nevertheless family-inspired ideology seems to influence the incentives for acquiring income 
corruptly. That said and as noted by Anders (2005), more often than not may bribes may be 
spent in wholly selfish ways. This has probably been the case way back, but there appears to 
be a tendency today that bribe (as well as legitimate) incomes are less frequently and exten-
sively shared now than some years back. Both the increase in corruption as well as the ten-
dency to not share may be due to an anomie-like situation. When the family loyalty and state 
ideology both operate, the official may solve the dilemma by catching the bribe and go to the 
bar.  
 
Smith (2007: 138 -139) describes an event that indicates that corruption may be sometimes be 
accepted, if shared. If not, social explosions may erupt. He tells a story from Nigeria in 1996. 
Rumours of child kidnappings had been circulating in Owerri, the Imo state in Nigeria for 
long. On local TV the freshly severed head of the child was displayed. The population be-
lieved it was done by members of the local elite, the fast-growing rich, who had not shared 
                                                 
51 Smith (1964) analyses the development of governmental structures in the Hausa states since the 14th century 
and find a number of instances where the population respond negatively when embezzlement and bribe levels are 
increasing. 
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any of their corruptly acquired income. They burned down the local hotel, a meeting place for 
the rich, and all the cars outside. Corruption is wrong, but if it happens, it should be shared. 
 
The Botswana low corruption case suggests that these kin-related mechanisms may not work 
the same way everywhere; that the patterns of colonial history, pre-colonial political systems, 
present access to resources and recent economic policies may interact in ways that give large 
scope for variation between the different African countries’ corruption experiences.  
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